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Abstract 
By using the data on Indian firms on the BSE 500 Index during the period 2005-2006, 
we find that family ownership affects group affiliated firms more positively than standalone 
firms. Group affiliated firms underperform initially as compared to standalone firms but after 
certain threshold of family ownership their performance becomes better than standalone 
firms. Within diversified Indian Business Group, family ownership affects highly diversified 
affiliates positively. Effect of family excess vote holdings and involvement of family 
management is found to be insignificant. We also find that block holders affect firm value 
negatively. Our results are in contrast with the existing literature of diversification and family 
ownership on developed market especially, US and UK. Some of our results are consistent 
with those of Khanna and Palepu (2000).  This paper supports most of the findings of Khanna 
and Palepu based on more complete and reliable data set. In addition, it shows that the 
superior performance of highly diversified groups is related to greater family ownership. 
In the second essay, we examined the issues related to market reaction on IT 
outsourcing announcement and firm characteristics which induce firms to outsource. We find 
that IT outsourcing has a strong positive effect on stock prices of announcing firms, 
especially for longer event windows. We also find that the higher the pre-announcement 
inefficiency of a firm (as evidenced by lower asset turnover ratios, higher operating cost to 
sales,  and higher cost of good sales to sales), the greater the positive price reaction to the 
outsourcing announcements. We also find that firms with higher information asymmetry 
problems (firms in the service industry) elicit a higher positive market reaction at the time of 
outsource announcement. Finally, firms that are likely to outsource are cost inefficient, and/or 
are cash needy. 
Keywords: Family ownership, diversification, Indian Business Group, IT, outsourcing.
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Essay 1 
Family ownership and its impact on diversified Indian Business Group 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Indian business consists of state and privately owned firms. Privately owned firms are 
classified in four segments---Indian Business Groups, Private Standalone-Indian, Foreign 
Business Houses, and Private Standalone-Foreign (see Appendix). An Indian business group 
is a collection of affiliates which are often publicly traded independent of each other. 
Although family ownership prevails in standalone firms as well, family-ownership is 
predominant with respect to Indian business groups. Large business groups in India are 
mostly family owned firms started by the family founder and then passed on from one 
generation to the next. 
In emerging markets, including India, information asymmetry and agency conflicts 
are likely to be more pronounced than in advanced markets. In this environment, the families 
play a pivotal role in the management of its affiliates by owning a large block of shares, 
placing family directors on the board, by using excess voting rights through crossholdings, or 
a combination of all three. Families enjoy several advantages, including capital, labor, and 
product markets over non-family firms. With a long history and name recognition of the 
owner-family, affiliated firms are better able to float new product, attract a better-qualified 
labor force, and gain easier access to financial markets. In additions, in India, as in many 
emerging countries, where political connections appear to be an integral part of doing 
business, family owners receive larger information advantage and less bureaucratic hurdles.  
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Family ownership has disadvantages as well. First, in the context of the Indian 
regulatory environment, where disclosure rules are not strictly followed or implemented, it is 
possible for the family to exercise unwarranted control over the group affairs that might be 
inconsistent with the value maximization goal. Second, in a conflict between minority 
shareholders and the controlling family, the family is likely to put its own interest before 
minority shareholders.  Third, the family may contribute to the poor performance of an 
affiliate by retaining (or appointing) a manager who happens to be a family member but who 
lacks the expertise or talent to carry out managerial responsibilities in a competent manner. 
Finally, entrenchment, sub-optimal investment, ‘socialism’ in group, rent seeking behavior 
among heads of firms, which are common problems in diversified conglomerates, can 
become more severe when such a conglomerate is headed by a family. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to answer the following two questions: 1) What 
role does family ownership play in explaining the performance of a group affiliate or a 
standalone firm? 2) Does the performance of a group affiliate relate to the extent of the 
group’s diversification, and if so, can this relation be explained by the extent of family 
ownership?  
Khanna & Palepu (2000) have examined these two issues. However, we believe that a 
reexamination of their findings is justified for the following reasons. First, Khanna and 
Palepu’s (2000) sample consists of Indian firms in the year 1993. Considering the fact that 
the economic reforms that have contributed to the unprecedented economic growth of modern 
India started in 1991, it is safe to say that Indian firms in 1993 did not experience the full  
benefit of reforms. Our sample on the other hand contains firms in 2006, 15 year after the 
economic reform was introduced. Second, until very recently, necessary data needed to test 
relevant hypotheses were not available in a refined form.   Subsequent to changes in the 
disclosure rules in India during 2005-2006, much of the reported data in filings to SEBI 
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(Securities and Exchange Board of India) have become more precise and reliable. For 
example, before 2005-2006 the data on family ownership and corporate holding were not 
reported, forcing Khanna and Palepu to rely on imprecise data or proxies. Third, Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) suggest that the family ownership effect must be viewed from three 
dimensions—actual stockholding, the extent of control, and extent of involvement in 
managing the firm. We contribute to literature by examining the role of the family in terms of 
all three dimensions. Fourth, we will investigate the role of family ownership in firm 
performance as the extent of diversification of the group changes. Due to the problem of data 
availability mentioned above, Khanna and Palepu were not able to perform this type of 
analysis. Such data are now commercially available. 
 The paper proceeds along following lines. Section 2 presents the literature review. 
Section 3   discusses hypotheses and methodology, while Section 4 presents results. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Survey 
 
2.1. Family Ownership and Firm Performance  
 
Several authors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Holderness and Sheehan, 1988,  Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny,  1989, Denis and Denis, 1994, Anderson and Reeb, 2003, and 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006) have examined the relationship between large shareholders 
(including family ownership) and firm performance . These studies have produced mixed 
results in that some studies find the relation to be positive, while others find this to be 
negative.  
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In developing their model, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that in a corporation with 
many small shareholders, no single stockholder has an incentive to monitor the management. 
They conclude that having a large minority shareholder solves the problem of monitoring 
incentive. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that family firms’ performance is inferior to 
that of non-family firms. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) examine S&P500 firms and find that family firms perform 
better than non-family firms. They also find that firm performance is better when a family 
member (rather than an outsider) serves as CEO. As such, they conclude that founding family 
ownership is not a less effective organizational structure. They suggest that in well-regulated 
and transparent markets, family ownership in public firms reduces agency problems. They 
examine the effect of family ownership and family management but do not distinguish 
ownership from control. 
Villalonga & Amit (2006) contend that to understand the difference between family 
firms and non-family firms fully, one must distinguish the effect of family ownership, family 
control, and family management on firm value. They argue that ownership, control and 
management enter into firm value independently as well as in combination. Family 
ownership can be seen as an effective way of reducing agency problem arising from owner-
manger conflict. But increase in family ownership with better performance of firms can also 
be seen as endogenous results: family will likely  continue its control when firms are 
profitable. Control measures by large shareholders are generally seen by small shareholders 
as a way of extracting private benefits. Incentive of expropriation increases when family 
firms are the largest shareholders with control mechanism, but their incentive to monitor also 
increases with increase of shareholding. Similarly, family management (having a family 
member as CEO) can reduce the owner- manager conflict. Thus, a combination of the family 
5 
 
being the largest shareholder of a firm and a family member simultaneously serving as its 
CEO bring to bear a positive impact on the firm value. 
Several studies examine the relation between family ownership and firm performance 
using non-US data, including Stangeland and Yeung, 2000, Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001, 
Cornqvist and Nilsson, 2003, and Barontini and Capiro, 2005. Stangeland and Yeung (2000) 
find that family ownership negatively affects firm performance in Canada. Faccio, Lang and 
Young (2001) conclude that it is the family ownership in loosely controlled firms that caused 
the East Asian crisis. They argue that controlling shareholders extract high returns from 
projects that yield negative returns to the corporation. Loosely affiliated family firms pay 
much lower dividend to their shareholders, thus increasing the chances of shareholder wealth 
expropriation. Cornqvist and Nisson (2003) report that Swedish firms in which families 
control minority shareholders are associated with largest discounts .  In contrast to above 
results, Barontini and Capiro (2005) find that family ownership positively influence firm 
performance for firms in continental Europe (excluding Ireland and UK). Positive impact 
continues even when controlling stake is held by descendents as long as the founder is still 
alive and sits on the board as non-executive directors. However, firm performance of 
descendant CEO is indistinguishable from that of a non-family firm. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) analyze performance of 
affiliates of diversified Indian business groups relative to unaffiliated firms. They also find 
that insider ownership (an indirect proxy for the family ownership) is positively related to the 
performance of group affiliates as well as unaffiliated firms. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) using a 
data over the 1995-96 period find that firm value increases once the directors holding 
increases more than 25%. They also find similar effect when foreign holdings or corporate 
holdings exceed 25%. Using an interaction term they find no significant difference between 
the effects of insider ownership and corporate holding on group and standalone companies.  
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2.2.  Family Ownership, Diversification, and Firm Performance 
 
A vast body of finance literature examines the costs and benefits of diversification. 
The literature sites two primary benefits of diversification: “more money” and “smarter 
money” effect. More money effect proposes that integration of this sort may allow more total 
external financing to be raised than could be raised by the individual business operating as 
standalone firm. Smarter money argument proposes that the internal capital market becomes 
more efficient with diversification. 
Lewellen (1971) argues that coinsurance across imperfectly correlated divisions increases 
the debt capacity of integrated firms. Hadlock, Ryngaert and Thomas (2001) argue that 
diversification helps to alleviate adverse selection problems. Scharfstein and Stein (1994), Li 
and Li (1996), Stein (1997) and others also argue in favor of smarter money theory. Graham, 
Lemmon and Wolf (2002) and Billet and Mauer (2003) find that diversification creates 
wealth. 
Diversification can increase the cost in terms of agency conflict between firms CEO and 
group owners as suggested by Rajan , Servaes and Zingales (2000) and  Scharftein and Stein 
(2000). The cost may also come in the form of rent seeking behavior of CEOs (Milgoram 
(1988), Meyer, Milgoram and Roberts (1992), Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Edin and Stiglitz 
(1995)). Diversified group can make inefficient investment decisions and tends to have a 
more “socialist” outcome in which weaker divisions (or firms) may get relatively more than it 
would under the first best case (Rajan Servaes and Zingales (2000),  and Scharfstein and 
Stein (2000)). 
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Khanna & Palepu (2000) examine the relation between diversification and family 
ownership in the context of India. Specifically, they compare the performance of affiliates of 
diversified Indian business groups relative to unaffiliated firms. Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
report that firm performance initially decline with group diversification and after certain 
threshold limit of diversification firm performance increases again. This result is in contrast 
to studies on US firms which report that the firm value decreases with group diversification. 
According to Khanna and Palepu, better access to international sources of capital afforded to 
group affiliated firms in India explains the differences in results. Additionally, they note that 
internal capital market does not affect affiliated and unaffiliated firms differently. Emerging 
markets like India are known for severe informational asymmetry, agency problem and lack 
of proper functioning institutions. The missing functions of institutions make it difficult for 
both stand alone or smaller groups to deal with external market. However, large groups are 
capable of replicating the function of intermediating institutions within the organization For 
smaller firms such replication is difficult or costly. In addition, they propose that the largest 
and most diversified business groups excel in performance because they can reap the benefits 
of political connections, especially in India where business is controlled by government 
through licensing.  
 
3. Hypothesis 
3.1. Family ownership and performance of group affiliates and Standalone firms 
 
Sarkar & Sarkar (2000) find that there is no significant difference in the effect of insider 
ownership in group and standalone firms. Khanna & Palepu (2000), find that insider 
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ownership (a proxy for family ownership) is positively related to the performance of group 
affiliates and unaffiliated firms alike. 
The presence of family ownership is beneficial to both affiliated and standalone firms. 
First, family ownership continues to exist from one generation to the next and as such have a 
long-term business horizon. Second, families are politically well connected and often derive 
benefits from the government that may not be accessible to other type of owners. Third, the 
families are revered by many because of their long-standing past as well as many social, 
religious, and charity activities in which the family owners are often engaged. Finally, a 
product originating from a family-owned firm is perceived by most Indians as seal of quality.  
In this paper, however, we posit that while family ownership is beneficial to both 
standalone and group-affiliated firms, it provides greater benefits to the latter group, 
especially in the business environment prevailing in India. Families that own groups are 
inherently different from those that own standalone firms. A group the culmination of what 
once was a standalone firm and thus serves as evidence of a successful operation that has 
withstood the test of time. In other words, families that own groups have been in existence for 
much longer than the families that own standalone firms, and therefore have to be 
consistently better performers, generation after generation. Thus, these families accumulate 
better managerial skills, command a superior brand loyalty, and wield a stronger political 
muscle.    
The family as owner of a group provides an additional benefit that is not available to 
the family owning a standalone firm. In an economy, where financial intermediaries are not 
fully developed, external financing is often difficult. In the context of a group, the families 
often play the role of a financial institution, making it possible for the affiliate to avoid being 
dependent on external financing alone.  Although a non-family group affiliate enjoys some of 
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the similar advantages over a standalone firm, when compared to a family group affiliate the 
former is deficient in that it lacks the family history,  possesses less political connection, 
exhibits lesser incentive alignment, and displays a shorter investment horizon (because of 
continuing changes in the management and ownership). This premise permits us to develop 
the following hypothesis.  
 
H-1: Family ownership affects performance of group affiliates more positively 
than standalone firms. 
  
3.2. Performance of group affiliates and extent of diversification 
 
Khanna & Palepu (2000) find a non-linear relation between extent of diversification and 
firm value of affiliates for Indian Business Group. They find that firm performance initially 
decline with group diversification and after a certain threshold firm value increases with the 
group diversification. They propose that the largest and most diversified business groups 
excel in performance because they can reap the benefits of political connections, especially in 
India because businesses are controlled by government through licensing. In India, where 
mature and efficiently functioning intermediaries might not exist at an adequate level, raising 
funds externally poses a problem. The problem diminishes as the groups become larger, 
making it easier for them to tap the domestic as well as international markets for external 
funding. This function is not easily replicated by standalone and affiliates of smaller groups.  
As mentioned in conjunction with Hypothesis I, we posit that families that own larger 
groups are inherently different from the families that own standalone firms and smaller 
groups. We argue that the families that own larger groups have proved to be more successful 
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business enterprises over a longer period of time and therefore possess, among other things, 
bigger political muscle and superior name recognition. Based on this premise, we further 
argue that the findings of Krishna and Palepu (2000) of superior performance of larger groups 
might be explained by higher family ownership of these groups. Thus, we hypothesize  
 
H-2:  The superior performance of larger groups are related to the 
extent of family involvement in managing these groups.. 
 
4. Data & Methodology 
4.1. Data 
We confine our sample search to group affiliates and standalone private firms in the 
BSE 500 (Bombay Stock Exchange) index during 2005-2006. We exclude Government-
owned Enterprises, and Joint Sector Industry because their goals are different from those of 
the firms in privately-owned industries. We exclude Foreign Business Houses because our 
objective in this paper is to examine the impact of family ownership on the firm value.  
We choose 2005-2006 because new disclosure rules became effective this year 
making the available data more reliable. Under new regulation firms have to disclose detailed 
information on corporate governance, equity holdings, and equity holding patterns. For 
example, equity holdings are now separated by promoters1 and non-promoters2 holdings. 
Promoters’ holding are further categorized into Indians and foreigners, while non-promoters 
                                                            
1 All individuals and their relatives, corporate bodies/trusts/partnership or any other type of entity, institutions, 
non-institutions who promoted/ founded the company and/ or who acquired the company, and are presently in 
‘control’ of the company. 
2 Non-Promoters are defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) as shareholders with no relation 
with the firm other than via equity holdings this includes institutions, non-institutions, and individuals. 
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holdings are separated by institutional  and non-institutional holdings. Our sample consists of 
214 firms which we obtain form the PROWESS database available through the Centre for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).   
We obtain various accounting and financial data from PROWESS. We hand-collect 
family ownership data (family ownership percentage, CEO and Chairman of firm, and family 
membership on the board)  from respective firm’s annual reports. Since we are able to hand-
collect the necessary proxies for family involvement in “management” for only 175 firms, we 
limit our analyses to this smaller sample when we include all three dimensions of ownership 
as defined by Villalonga and Amit (2006).  
4.2.  Methodology 
4.2.1. Impact of Family Ownership on Firm Value 
To test for the possible impact of family ownership, family excess vote holdings and 
family management, we employ the following basic model for all our tests:  
Tobin q or ROA = 0β  + 1β (GROUP)  + 2β (FAM%) + 3β  (VOTE)+ 4β   
(MGMT) + 5β   ( BLOCK_NP) + 6β  (DIR) + 7β  (log SALES) +  8β  (log 
AGE) +  9β  (BROAD_IT) +   10β  (BROAD_CONST) +  11β  
(BROAD_OTHER) +ε ...................................................................... (1) 
To test for the possible differential impact of family ownership on group affiliates and 
standalone firms, we employ equation 1 and add on interaction term  for each of the three 
dimensions of ownership as suggested  by Villalonga and Amit (2006). The resulting 
regression model we test is as follows:  
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Tobin q or ROA = 0β  + 1β (GROUP)  + 2β (FAM%) +  3β   (VOTE)+  4β   
(MGMT) +  5β  (INTERACTION BETWEEN GROUP AND EACH 
DIMENSION OF OWNERSHIP) + 6β  ( BLOCK_NP) + 7β  (DIR) + 8β  (log 
SALES) + 9β   (log AGE) + 10β   (BROAD_IT) +   11β  (BROAD_CONST) + 
12β   (BROAD_OTHER) +ε ................................... (2) 
As stated before,  we employ the smaller sample (175) when we include MGMT and DIR in 
any equation. The variables are defined below. 
 
Firm  Performance:  Consistent with Bebchuk et al (2000), Khanna and Palepu 
(2000), Barontini and Caprio  (2005) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). and Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), we use Tobin’s q as proxies for market performance and ROA for 
operating performance.  
Tobin’s q = [market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book 
value of debt]/ [(book value of assets)] (We calculate market value of equity 
using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the year.) 
 ROA =  [(net income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total assets) 
These definitions of Tobin’s q and ROA are not without limitations. Tobin’s q varies 
positively with the growth of the firm. This relation might introduce biases in results when 
comparing firms at different stages of their life cycle. If firm A is in the early stage of the life 
cycle and B is in the later stage, the q of A is likely  to be higher than that of firm B. In this 
case, the differential q is due the difference in the age of the two firms and might be 
completely unrelated to the degree of family ownership. The accounting treatment in India 
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leads to additional downward bias in ROA. For example, Indian accounting practice 
recognizes investments at cost lower than market value, and recognizes profit only when 
dividends are received for inter-corporate investments (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). In spite of 
the limitations, we use these two measures since they have been frequently used by 
researchers. 
GROUP =  This is a dummy variable which takes on a value one when the firm is 
affiliated to a group, 0 otherwise. 
FAM% = Percentage of all classes of shares held by the family as a group or as an 
individual. For the purpose of measuring family holdings, we follow the Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) approach by considering all co-trustees and directors associated with 
the family as family members. The assumption is that if these people are beneficiaries 
of the family, then their incentives are also aligned with those of the family. This 
figure is available through equity holding information disclosed by firm under the 
category Promoters- Individual and Hindu Undivided Family. 
VOTE=  Percentage of votes owned by the family in excess of the percentage of 
shares they own;3In Indian context excess vote holding over share holding can be 
calculated by taking a difference of shareholding of corporate bodies (promoters) and 
shareholding of Individuals and Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). Shareholdings 
                                                            
3  Villalonga and Amit (2000) describe that excess voting may come from various sources: multiple share 
classes, pyramids, cross-holdings, and voting agreements. Multiple share classes are voting structures such that 
the firm has issued two or more classes of stock with differential voting rights. Pyramids are control structures 
whereby the family holds shares in the firm through one or more intermediate entities such as trusts, funds, 
foundations, limited partnerships, holdings, or any other form of corporation of which the family owns less than 
100%. Cross-holdings are control structures in which the firm owns shares in a corporation that belongs to the 
family’s chain of control in the firm. Voting agreements are pacts among shareholders that result in the family’s 
holding voting power over a larger number of shares than what it owns with investment power.  
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under corporate bodies (promoter) include all the shares held by family or friends of 
family indirectly through institutions or non-institutions.    
MGMT = This is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if CEO is a family 
member, 0 otherwise; 
Control Variables:  
SALES: The natural log of Sales. (Sales indicate the future opportunities as 
well as present opportunities of firm. We control for sales because momentary 
sales can influence firm value.) 
AGE: The natural log of years since the firm’s inception. (Age of the firm can 
affect the firm value since older firms can provide entry barrier to new firms. 
However, starter firms with new concepts and better technology can also grab 
the market. ) 
DIR: Number of non-family outside directors (i.e., directors that are not 
managers as well, either active or retired), divided by the total number of 
directors on the Board. Weisbach (1988) suggests that proportion of outside 
directors act as proxy for board independence and we expect that higher the 
degree of board independence, the stronger the monitoring role the board can 
provide. 
BLOCK_NP: The percentage of shares held by non-promoter block holders is 
defined by SEBI as shareholders with no relation with the firm other than via 
equity holdings (This group includes institutions, non-institutions, and 
individuals. The presence of block holders can influence the management and 
control of family.  
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Non- promoters block holders can enhance or reduce the effectiveness 
of family control. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that a large shareholders, 
unaffiliated with management, can monitor management well which decreases 
the chances of expropriation. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that 
unaffiliated large shareholders can also facilitate changes in control. However, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) on US market and 
Sarkar & Sarkar (2000), Kumar (2004) and Khanna & Palepu (2000) on 
Indian markets, find coefficient of non-promoters block holders negative. 
Non-promoter block holders can also lead to conflict between institutional 
interest and shareholders’ interest. At times, even nominees of institutional 
investors are perceived as conflict-makers. For example, Hindustan Lever Ltd, 
an Indian blue chip company, simply refused to induct anybody on its board 
from institutional investors 
Industry Control Variables: Firm value differs systematically on the type of 
industry. To control potential differences among industries, we use four 
control variables: Broad_Manu (control for Manufacturing industry); 
Broad_IT (control for IT Industry); Broad_Const (control for Construction 
industry); and Broad_Other (control for all other industry). 
 
4.2.2.  Family Ownership and Extent of Group Diversification 
To examine the impact of diversification on the performance of business 
groups, we use the following OLS regression.  
Tobin q or ROA = 0β  +  1β (FAM%) +  2β (VOTE)+ 3β  (MGMT)+ 4β  ( 
BLOCK_NP) + 5β  (DIR) +  6β  (IND#) + 7β  (IND# * IND#) + 8β  (log 
16 
 
SALES) + 9β  (log AGE) + 10β  (BROAD_IT) + 11β  (BROAD_CONST) + 12β  
(BROAD_OTHER) +ε ...................................................................................(3) 
  
Regression 3 adds IND# and IND# * IND# to Regression 2 minus the 
interaction term.   IND# * IND# is used to see if a non-linear relationship 
exists.  
IND#:  It measures the number of industries in which the group is involved.4
  
We divide our sample by the extent of diversification based on the results we 
receive by further analysis of the regression using Equation 3 above. 
Tobin q or ROA = 0β  +  1β (FAM%) +  2β (VOTE)+ 3β  (MGMT) + 4β  ( 
BLOCK_NP) + 5β (DIR) + 6β (DIV2_7) + 7β   (DIV8+) +  8β  (log SALES) + 
9β  (log AGE) + 10β  (BROAD_IT) + 11β  (BROAD_CONST) + 12β  
(BROAD_OTHER) +ε ...................................................................................(4) 
 
Regression 4 adds the following variables to Equation 3 replacing IND# and 
IND# * IND#: 
DIV1:  It is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if it is standalone firm or 
when the group concentrates in one industry; 
DIV2_7: It is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if group is involved in two 
to seven industries, it is zero otherwise. 
                                                            
4 CMIE data provides two types of industry coding: CMIE codes and NIC codes (which is similar to SIC codes 
for US firms). We use the broad category of NIC codes to determine the number of industries participated in by 
a business group.  
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DIV8+: It is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if group is involved in 
eight or more industries, it is zero otherwise. 
 
Finally, in order to examine the impact of the broader definition of ownership----
ownership percentage, control, and management---- on the value of an affiliate depending on 
the extent of diversification, we use the following three regressions. 
Tobin q or ROA = 0β  + 1β ( FAM%) + 2β ( VOTE)+ 3β (MGMT) + 4β  ( 
BLOCK_NP) + 5β (DIR) + 6β (log SALES) + 7β (log AGE )+ 
8β (INTERACTION-1) + 9β (INTERACTION-2) + 10β (BROAD_IT) 
+ 11β (BROAD_CONST) +  12β  (BROAD_OTHER)   
+ε ……......................................................................................................(5) 
INTERACTION: To explore the issue of differential impact of family 
ownership, family excess vote holdings, and family management on the 
value of an affiliate depending on the extent of diversification, we 
interacted a dummy variable, DIV2_7 & DIV8+ with each variable. 
Hence, we will have following variables as our interaction term: 
1. INTERACTION-1= (DIV2_7 * FAM%), (DIV2_7 * VOTE) and 
(DIV2_7 * MGMT) & INTERACTION-2=  (DIV8+ * FAM%), (DIV8+ 
* VOTE), (DIV8+ * MGMT) : The coefficients on the interaction terms 
picks up the difference, if any, in the effect of family ownership, family 
excess vote holding, and family management between affiliate of less 
diversified and affiliate of highly diversified groups.  
Due to unavailability of family management (MGMT) data for all the 
firms, we get results for only 175 observations. Results when using all 214 
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firms but without the MGMT interaction term are available on request 
from the author.  
 
5. Results and Analysis 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
TABLE 1: This table reports descriptive statistics of firms affiliated with diversified Indian business groups 
relative to those  firms that are not affiliated.  P/B is an approximation to Tobin’s q, measured as [market value 
of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ [(book value of assets)] , where we calculate 
market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the year. ROA is measured as [(net 
income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total assets). Sales and Assets are in Rupees millions. Age reflects the 
number of year since incorporation. Family ownership stake is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the 
family as a group or as an individual. Family excess vote holdings are the percentage of votes owned by the 
family in excess of the percentage of shares they own. Non-promoters shareholdings is the percentage of shares 
held by non-promoter is defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) as shareholders with no 
relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This group includes institutions, non-institutions, and 
individuals). Less diversified (Div2_7) is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if group is involved in two to 
seven industries, it is zero otherwise. Highly diversified (Div8+) is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if 
group is involved in eight or more industries, it is zero otherwise. For Panel A: The first two columns report 
means for group affiliates and non-group firms; significance levels are based on two-tailed difference of mean t-
tests. The last two columns report medians of group affiliates and non-group firms; significance levels are based 
on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the difference of medians. For Panel B: All significance levels refer to 
comparisons of group affiliates of different group diversification and group size categories of non-group firms. 
Two-tailed t-tests are used for the pair-wise, comparision of means, and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used for 
the pair-wise comparisons of median. The sample contains Indian private firms (group or standalone) from 
manufacturing and service industry listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-500) during year 2005-2006. 
PANEL: A – Summary Statistics & Ownership Structure 
 Mean  Median 
 
Group 
Affiliates 
Non-Group 
Affiliates 
 Group 
Affiliates 
Non-Group 
Affiliates 
Summary Statistics      
      
Number 153 63  153 63 
SALES (in Rs. Millions) 27764.82 6822.23a  9283.60 2803.70a 
ASSETS (in Rs. Millions) 33650.37 8240.09a  12911.80 4023.50a 
AGE (YEARS) 35.36 21.43a  28 18a 
P/B 5.434 5.539  4.770 4.140 
ROA 0.085 0.097  0.074 0.085 
      
Ownership Structure      
      
FAMILY OWNERSHIP (%) 7.737 27.182a  1.290 23.290a 
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FAMILY EXCESS VOTE 
HOLDING 29.392 6.915a 
 
32.230 0.000a 
NON-PROMOTERS 
HOLDING 50.476 54.325 
 
52.540 55.730 
 
PANEL: B - The Extent of Diversification by Indian Business Groups 
Affiliation 
Number 
of  
Firms 
Number 
of 
Groups 
Total Assets 
(Rs. Millions) 
 Percentage 
of Sample 
Assets P/B ROA 
    
 
 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Mean  Median 
Full 
Sample 214  5600332.00 
 
100.00 5.465 4.675 0.088 0.076 
Non- 
Group 63  519125.60 
 
9.27 5.539 4.140 0.097 0.085 
All 
Groups 151 103 5081207.00a 
 
90.73 5.434 4.770 0.085 0.074 
one 43 39 930278.10a  16.61 5.925 5.840 0.098 0.084 
less(2-7) 83 57 3254434.00b  58.11 4.897 4.410 0.077 0.073 
high(8+) 25 7 896494.40a  16.01 6.373 5.200 0.087 0.063 
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of firm attributes of group 
affiliates and non-group Affiliates. The group affiliates are significantly larger in terms of 
sales and assets and they are older in age as compared to unaffiliated firms. The mean 
(median) sales of group affiliated firms in year 2005-2006 is 27764.82 (9283.60) million 
Indian rupees which is 307% (231.11%) times bigger than unaffiliated firm. Affiliated firms 
mean (median) age is 35 yrs (28yrs) which is 14 years (10 years) older than unaffiliated 
firms. Our univariate test shows that, despite these differences in sales, assets and age there is 
no significant difference in mean and median values of P/B and ROA of affiliated and 
unaffiliated firm. 
Panel A also shows that family ownership is much lower in an affiliate than in a 
standalone firm: 7.7% vs. 27.18%. However, in terms of excess vote holdings, a family 
exercises much greater control in affiliates than in standalone: 30% vs. 7%. The average asset 
size of a group affiliate is more than four times as big as a standalone firm.  
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Panel B of Table 1 compares some characteristics between less diversified and 
more diversified groups.  The univariate analysis suggests that firms which are less 
diversified (2-7) has P/B value of 4.9 compared to P/B of 5.5 for standalone firms. P/B of a 
more diversified (8+) group, however, is larger than that of a standalone firm (6.4). ROAs 
show a similar pattern. Pair wise comparison tests of group affiliates of different diversified 
groups and standalone firms as well non-diversified group affiliates show that there is no 
statistically significant difference in their mean or median P/B or ROA. However, pair-wise 
comparison tests show that there are significant differences in asset sizes among the firms in 
3 categories: less diversified, more diversified groups, and standalone firms. One reason for 
the total asset size of the less diversified group being the highest is that this group dominates 
in number in the sample. 
5.2. Impact of Family Ownership on Group Affiliates and Standalone 
TABLE 2: This table reports OLS regressions examining differential impact of family ownership on group 
affiliates and standalone firms’ performance. Dependent variable is P/B in panel A which is an approximation to 
Tobin’s q. This is measured as [market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ 
[(book value of assets)] , where we calculate market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading 
day of the year. Panel B uses ROA as dependent variable, measured as [(net income + interest) * (1-tax 
rate))]/(total assets). The independent variables are a set of firm-specific attributes, family ownership, excess 
vote holdings, group dummies, and industry dummies. Family (Non-family) firms refer to those firms with 
(without) one or more family members are officers or directors, own 5% or more of the firm equity, either 
individually or as a group. Family ownership stake (FAM%) is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the 
family as a group or as an individual. Family excess vote holdings (VOTE) is the percentage of votes owned by 
the family in excess of the percentage of shares they own. Non-promoters block holders (BLOCK_NP) 
shareholdings is the percentage of shares held by non-promoter block holders is defined by SEBI (Securities and 
Exchange Board of India) as shareholders with no relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This 
group includes institutions, non-institutions, and individuals). The group dummy (GROUP) measures 
membership in a diversified group. The sample contains Indian private firms (group or standalone) from 
manufacturing and service industry listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-500) during year 2005-2006. (Refer 
to Equation 2.) 
 
Included 
observations: 214 
 
(Panel: A) 
Dependent Variable: P/B  
(Panel: B) 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variable Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
             
C 5.956b  5.745  0.020  0.028 
  (0.018)  (0.027)  (0.614)  (0.474) 
GROUP -1.808b  0.034  -0.045a  -0.037a 
  (0.052)  (0.967)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
FAM% -0.027  0.012  0.000  0.000 
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  (0.276)  (0.589)  (0.420)  (0.993) 
(GROUP)*(FAM%) 0.084a     0.001c    
  (0.007)     (0.061)    
(GROUP)*(VOTE)    -0.013     0.001c 
     (0.705)     (0.092) 
VOTE 0.007  0.007  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.719)  (0.849)  (0.418)  (0.216) 
BLOCK_NP -0.043b  -0.046b  -0.001b  -0.001b 
  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.012) 
LOG(SALES) 0.313c  0.260  0.008a  0.008a 
  (0.095)  (0.170)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
LOG(AGE) -0.035  -0.105  0.016a  0.015b 
  (0.927)  (0.786)  (0.008)  (0.015) 
BROAD_CONST 1.273  0.979  -0.030b  -0.033b 
  (0.179)  (0.306)  (0.044)  (0.024) 
BROAD_IT 0.515  0.524  0.072a  0.071a 
  (0.500)  (0.501)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BROAD_OTHER -0.362  -0.440  -0.011  -0.008 
  (0.583)  (0.518)  (0.294)  (0.445) 
R-squared 0.098  0.066  0.285  0.282 
Adjusted R-squared 0.053  0.020  0.249  0.247 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.685  1.682  1.677  1.684 
F-statistic 2.201b  1.430  8.075a  7.982a 
 (0.019)  (0.169)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
 
Table 2 reports the impact of family ownership on the performance of group 
affiliates and standalone firms based on Equation 2 stated above. Panel A uses P/B while 
Panel B uses ROA as the dependent variable. The most noteworthy result reported in Panel A 
is that although initially group affiliates perform poorer than standalone firms, the gap 
narrows as family ownership percentage increases. For standalone firms, the impact of every 
1% increase of family ownership on P/B is -0.02%. However, for group affiliates, this impact 
is about 0.084%.  This difference in a sample, where average P/B is 5.45, is economically and 
statistically significant. In other words, the value of a group affiliate increases by 0.06% (= -
0.02706 +0.083553) with every 1% increase of family ownership. This finding is in contrast 
to the findings of Khanna and Palepu (1999) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2000).  Both studies 
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report that the effect of insider ownership is not significantly different between group 
affiliates and standalone firms. Figure 1 shows that after 21.64% of family ownership, groups 
perform better than standalone firms. Table 2 also reports the interaction of family excess 
vote holding with group. However, the result is not significant.  
This result is in contrast to Villalonga & Amit (2006) for US firms where they 
find that the family excess vote holding negatively affects the firm performance. The 
difference in the two results may be attributed to the possibility that cross-holdings by 
families are not perceived in India to cause increased agency costs. 
FIGURE 1. This figure is based on results from Table 2, Panel A. P/B value is calculated by keeping 
BLOCK_NP, LOG(SALES), LOG(AGE), BROAD_CONST, BROAD_IT, AND BROAD_OTHER equal to 
zero. 
 
Table 2 results also shows that concentration of family ownership works in opposite 
direction in case of stand-alone and group firms, with the effect of family ownership being 
negative on standalone but positive on group affiliates. This result is inconsistent with what 
Sarkar & Sarkar (2000) and Khanna & Palepu (2000) find. Our result suggests that 
opportunities  for entrenchment increase with the increase of family ownership in standalone 
firms. Also, when family ownership increases in a business group, resulting benefits 
discussed earlier increases the value of group affiliates. Another result of Table 2 is that the 
effect of non-promoters blockholders is negatively related to firm performance, signifying 
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that that outside blockholders cause friction in firm’s management rather than providing 
monitoring service for minority shareholders. This result is consistent with the finding of  
Sarkar & Sarkar (2000) and Khanna & Palepu (2000). 
Table 2, Panel B repeats the analysis of Panel A with ROA as the dependent 
variable. Results are similar to those reported in Panel A. Keeping all other factors constant, 
ROA of a group firm is 0.045 percentage point lower than a standalone firm. For group firms, 
the differential of family ownership, as compared to standalone firms, is 0.001% higher and 
statistically significant. Firm value of a group firm increases 0.001% with every 1% increase 
of family ownership. Also  interaction term of family excess vote holdings and group dummy 
is significant which indicates that family excess vote holding has more positive impact on 
group affiliated firms. Firm value of a group affiliate increases 0.001% with every 1% 
increase of family excess vote holding. 
TABLE 3-1: This table reports OLS regressions examining differential impact of the broader definition of 
family ownership--- ownership percentage, control and management---- on group affiliates and standalone 
firms’ performance. Dependent variable is P/B in panel A which is an approximation to Tobin’s q. This is 
measured as [market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ [(book value of 
assets)] , where we calculate market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the 
year. Panel B uses ROA as dependent variable, measured as [(net income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total 
assets).  The independent variables are a set of firm-specific attributes, family ownership, excess vote holdings, 
group dummies, and industry dummies. Family (Non-family) firms refer to those firms with (without) one or 
more family members are officers or directors, own 5% or more of the firm equity, either individually or as a 
group. Family ownership stake (FAM%) is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the family as a group 
or as an individual. Family excess vote holdings (VOTE) is the percentage of votes owned by the family in 
excess of the percentage of shares they own. Family Management (MGMT) is a dummy variable, it takes on a 
value of 1 if CEO is a family member, 0 otherwise. Non-promoters block holders (BLOCK_NP) shareholdings 
is the percentage of shares held by non-promoter block holders is defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange 
Board of India) as shareholders with no relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This group 
includes institutions, non-institutions, and individuals). Proportion of outside directors (DIR) is number of non-
family outside directors (i.e., directors that are not managers as well, either active or retired), divided by the total 
number of directors on the Board. The group dummy (GROUP) measures membership in a diversified group. 
The sample contains Indian private firms (group or standalone) from manufacturing and service industry listed 
in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-500) during year 2005-2006. (Refer to Equation 2.) 
 
 
Included 
observations: 175 
Panel (A)  
Dependent Variable: P/B  
Panel (B)  
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variable Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
                   
C 7.113b  6.487b  7.820b  0.039  0.040  0.054 
  (0.023)  (0.041)  (0.018)  (0.410)  (0.407)  (0.284) 
GROUP -2.314 b  -0.052  -1.423  -0.035b  -0.028b  -0.036b 
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  (0.033)  (0.954)  (0.224)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.043) 
(GROUP)*( FAM%) 0.092a   
 
  
 
   0.001 
 
  
 
  
  (0.011)        (0.208)       
(GROUP)*( VOTE)    -0.029        0.001    
     (0.484)        (0.223)    
(GROUP)*(MGMT)       1.680        0.026 
        (0.227)        (0.228) 
FAM% -0.032  0.020  0.020  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.297)  (0.400)  (0.404)  (0.814)  (0.498)  (0.422) 
VOTE -0.007  0.007  -0.020  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.723)  (0.867)  (0.340)  (0.678)  (0.318)  (0.911) 
MGMT -1.107c  -1.038c  -2.392c  -0.011  -0.012  -0.031 
  (0.065)  (0.090)  (0.056)  (0.218)  (0.195)  (0.102) 
BLOCK_NP -0.057a  -0.059a  -0.058a  -0.001b  -0.001b  -0.001b 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.027)  (0.017)  (0.029) 
DIR 0.003  0.004  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.819)  (0.807)  (0.821)  (0.456)  (0.433)  (0.466) 
LOG(SALES) 0.456b  0.406c  0.376c  0.008b  0.008b  0.007b 
  (0.036)  (0.066)  (0.090)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.038) 
LOG(AGE) -0.174  -0.275  -0.269  0.007  0.007  0.007 
  (0.692)  (0.539)  (0.546)  (0.277)  (0.281)  (0.334) 
BROAD_CONST 0.088  0.146  0.136  -0.030  -0.030  -0.030 
  (0.948)  (0.915)  (0.921)  (0.144)  (0.157)  (0.146) 
BROAD_IT 0.321  0.298  0.192  0.077  0.077  0.076 
  (0.692)  (0.718)  (0.817)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BROAD_OTHER -0.697  -0.717  -0.685  -0.017  -0.014  -0.018 
  (0.369)  (0.374)  (0.386)  (0.151)  (0.271)  (0.140) 
R-squared 0.156  0.124  0.130  0.297  0.297  0.297 
Adjusted R-squared 0.093  0.060  0.065  0.245  0.245  0.244 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.827  1.806  1.782  1.807  1.786  1.795 
F-statistic 2.494a  1.918b  2.012b  5.708a  5.696a  5.692a 
 (0.005)  (0.036)  (0.026)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
TABLE 3-2: This table reports OLS regressions examining the combined impact of the broader definition of 
family ownership--- ownership percentage, control and management---- on group affiliates and standalone 
firms’ performance. Dependent variable is P/B in panel A which is an approximation to Tobin’s q. This is 
measured as [market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ [(book value of 
assets)] , where we calculate market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the 
year. Panel B uses ROA as dependent variable, measured as [(net income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total 
assets).  The independent variables are a set of firm-specific attributes, family ownership, excess vote holdings, 
group dummies, and industry dummies. Family (Non-family) firms refer to those firms with (without) one or 
more family members are officers or directors, own 5% or more of the firm equity, either individually or as a 
group. Family ownership stake (FAM%) is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the family as a group 
or as an individual. Family excess vote holdings (VOTE) is the percentage of votes owned by the family in 
excess of the percentage of shares they own. Family Management (MGMT) is a dummy variable, it takes on a 
value of 1 if CEO is a family member, 0 otherwise. Non-promoters block holders (BLOCK_NP) shareholdings 
is the percentage of shares held by non-promoter block holders is defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange 
Board of India) as shareholders with no relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This group 
includes institutions, non-institutions, and individuals). Proportion of outside directors (DIR) is number of non-
family outside directors (i.e., directors that are not managers as well, either active or retired), divided by the total 
number of directors on the Board. The group dummy (GROUP) measures membership in a diversified group. 
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The sample contains Indian private firms (group or standalone) from manufacturing and service industry listed 
in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-500) during year 2005-2006. (Refer to Equation 2.) 
 
 
Included 
observations: 175 
 
(Panel: A)  
Dependent Variable: 
P/B 
 
(Panel: B)  
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variable Coeff.  Coeff. 
    
C 7.990b  0.071 
  (0.016)  (0.156) 
GROUP -3.332b  -0.080a 
  (0.045)  (0.002) 
FAM% -0.035  0.000 
  (0.295)  (0.443) 
(GROUP)*(FAM%) 0.095b  0.001c 
  (0.020)  (0.074) 
(GROUP)*(VOTE) 0.028  0.002b 
  (0.553)  (0.026) 
(GROUP)*(MGMT) 1.015  0.031 
  (0.485)  (0.167) 
VOTE -0.032  -0.001c 
  (0.477)  (0.067) 
MGMT -1.939  -0.038 
  (0.137)  (0.059) 
BLOCK_NP -0.057a  -0.001b 
  (0.005)  (0.025) 
DIR 0.003  0.000 
  (0.826)  (0.451) 
LOG(SALES) 0.442b  0.008b 
  (0.046)  (0.022) 
LOG(AGE) -0.160  0.009 
  (0.719)  (0.203) 
BROAD_CONST 0.084  -0.030 
  (0.950)  (0.140) 
BROAD_IT 0.254  0.075a 
  (0.756)  (0.000) 
BROAD_OTHER -0.642  -0.013 
  (0.420)  (0.289) 
R-squared 0.160  0.322 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086  0.263 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.816  1.906 
F-statistic 2.171b  5.436a 
 (0.011)  (0.000) 
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
 
Table 3-1, Panels A and B employ the expanded definition of ownership 
suggested by Villalonga and  Amit (2006). Panel A (Panel B) introduces each interaction 
term separately to asset its impact on P/B (ROA) of group affiliates.  Panel A indicates that 
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family ownership has a significant  positive effect, while  family excess vote holding and 
family management have no significant impact on P/B of group affiliated firms, When the 
dependent variable is ROA (Panel B), however, none of the ownership coefficients -- family 
ownership, family excess vote holding, and family management--- is significant. 
Villalongs and Amit (2006) suggest that the three dimensions of ownership can 
either individually or in combination affect the firm performance In Table 3-2, all three 
dimensions of ownership are entered simultaneously to measure their combined impact. 
Table 3-2, Panel A results are similar to those of Panel A of Table 3-1. Table 3-2-B results 
are, however, slightly different from the ones reported in Table 3-1-B as the former shows 
that the combined impact of family ownership and family excess vote holding is significantly 
positive on the ROA of group affiliates.  
 
5.3. Family Ownership and the Extent of Diversification 
  Following  Khanna & Palepu (1999), we also test for the existence of a non-
linear relation between group diversification and firm performance. In so doing, we add two 
regressors---IND# and (IND# * IND#), Table 4, Panel A shows that both IND# and ( IND# * 
IND#) are significant providing evidence of non-linear relationship.  This relationship is 
depicted in Figure 2, which shows that an affiliate performs poorly relative to a standalone 
when the former is part of a group involved in two to seven industries. However, an affiliate 
of a group which is involved in more than seven industries performs better than a standalone 
firm. In other words, once the group involvement exceeds seven industries, each additional 
industry contributes positively to the Tobin’s q.   
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TABLE 4: This table reports OLS regressions examining incremental impact of group membership on firm 
performance using the broader definition of family ownership--- ownership percentage, control and 
management. Dependent variable is P/B in panel A which is an approximation to Tobin’s q. This is measured as 
[market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ [(book value of assets)] , where 
we calculate market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the year. Panel B uses 
ROA as dependent variable, measured as [(net income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total assets). The independent 
variables are a set of firm-specific attributes, family ownership, excess vote holdings, group dummies, and 
industry dummies. Family (Non-family) firms refer to those firms with (without) one or more family members 
are officers or directors, own 5% or more of the firm equity, either individually or as a group. Family ownership 
stake (FAM%) is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the family as a group or as an individual. Family 
excess vote holdings (VOTE) is the percentage of votes owned by the family in excess of the percentage of 
shares they own. Family Management (MGMT) is a dummy variable, it takes on a value of 1 if CEO is a family 
member, 0 otherwise. Non-promoters block holders (BLOCK_NP) shareholdings is the percentage of shares 
held by non-promoter block holders is defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) as 
shareholders with no relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This group includes institutions, non-
institutions, and individuals). Proportion of outside directors (DIR) is number of non-family outside directors 
(i.e., directors that are not managers as well, either active or retired), divided by the total number of directors on 
the Board. The group dummy (GROUP) measures membership in a diversified group. Number of Industries 
(IND#) measures the number of industries in which the group is involved. The sample contains Indian private 
firms (group or standalone) from manufacturing and service industry listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-
500) during year 2005-2006. (Refer to Equation 3 & 4.) 
 
Included 
observations: 175 
Panel (A)  
Dependent Variable: P/B  
Panel (B) 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variable Coeff.  Coeff. 
    
C 8.172  0.041 
  (0.011)  (0.404) 
FAM% 0.010  0.000 
  (0.659)  (0.545) 
VOTE -0.026  0.000 
  (0.200)  (0.911) 
MGMT -0.847  -0.013 
  (0.181)  (0.191) 
BLOCK_NP -0.061a  -0.001c 
  (0.003)  (0.073) 
DIR 0.006  0.000 
  (0.699)  (0.372) 
LOG(SALES) 0.341  0.007 
  (0.121)  (0.034) 
LOG(AGE) -0.364  0.006 
  (0.404)  (0.408) 
IND#  -0.473c  -0.009b 
  (0.082)  (0.032) 
(IND#)*(IND#) 0.036b  0.001b 
  (0.025)  (0.037) 
BROAD_CONST 0.012  -0.034 
  (0.993)  (0.105) 
BROAD_IT -0.253  0.070a 
  (0.763)  (0.000) 
BROAD_OTHER -0.913  -0.018 
  (0.246)  (0.130) 
R-squared 0.156  0.298 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.094  0.246 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.851  1.782 
F-statistic 2.502a  5.731a 
 (0.005)  (0.000) 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
FIGURE 2.  
 
Table 4, Panel B, which uses ROA as the dependent variable, also shows that both 
IND# and (IND# * IND#) are significant. Once the involvement of group increases to more 
than five industries, marginal increase in group diversification contributes to ROA. Figure 3 
depicts this relationship. Our results are similar to Khanna & Palepu (1999) in that their 
inflection point is six industries for Tobin’s q and eight industries for ROA.  
FIGURE 3. 
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Based on figure 2 and figure 3, we divide our sample into two sub categories: 
less-diversified group and more-diversified firms. A firm falls into the less diversified sub-
category (DIV2_7) when it is an affiliate of a group that is involved in two to seven. When an 
affiliate is part of a group that is diversified in 8 or more industries, it belongs to (DIV8+) 
category. Panels A and B of Table 5 show opposite signs for coefficients for (DIV2_7) and 
(DIV8+)---negative for the former and positive for the latter. This result reinforces our 
previous finding of non-linear relation between firm and group diversification from Table 4. 
This is also consistent with the result found in the Krishna and Palepu (2000) study. 
TABLE 5: This table reports OLS regressions examining incremental impact of group membership on firm 
performance using the broader definition of family ownership--- ownership percentage, control and 
management. Dependent variable is P/B in panel A which is an approximation to Tobin’s q. This is measured as 
[market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ [(book value of assets)] , where 
we calculate market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the year. Panel B uses 
ROA as dependent variable, measured as [(net income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total assets). The independent 
variables are a set of firm-specific attributes, family ownership, excess vote holdings, group dummies, and 
industry dummies. Family (Non-family) firms refer to those firms with (without) one or more family members 
are officers or directors, own 5% or more of the firm equity, either individually or as a group. Family ownership 
stake (FAM%) is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the family as a group or as an individual. Family 
excess vote holdings (VOTE) is the percentage of votes owned by the family in excess of the percentage of 
shares they own. Family Management (MGMT) is a dummy variable, it takes on a value of 1 if CEO is a family 
member, 0 otherwise. Non-promoters block holders (BLOCK_NP) shareholdings is the percentage of shares 
held by non-promoter block holders is defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) as 
shareholders with no relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This group includes institutions, non-
institutions, and individuals). Proportion of outside directors (DIR) is number of non-family outside directors 
(i.e., directors that are not managers as well, either active or retired), divided by the total number of directors on 
the Board. The group dummy (GROUP) measures membership in a diversified group. Less diversified (Div2_7) 
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if group is involved in two to seven industries, it is zero otherwise. 
Highly diversified (Div8+) is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if group is involved in eight or more 
industries, it is  zero otherwise.  The sample contains Indian private firms (group or standalone) from 
manufacturing and service industry listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-500) during year 2005-2006. (Refer 
to Equation 3 & 4.) 
 
Included 
observations: 175 
Panel (A) 
Dependent Variable: P/B  
Panel (B) 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variable Coeff.  Coeff. 
    
C 7.520  0.036 
  (0.019)  (0.464) 
FAM% 0.013  0.000 
  (0.596)  (0.500) 
VOTE -0.021  0.000 
  (0.300)  (0.970) 
MGMT -0.915c  -0.012 
  (0.140)  (0.229) 
BLOCK_NP -0.065a  -0.001b 
  (0.002)  (0.044) 
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DIR 0.005  0.000 
  (0.757)  (0.414) 
LOG(SALES) 0.362  0.007 
  (0.101)  (0.038) 
LOG(AGE) -0.279  0.005 
  (0.520)  (0.415) 
DIV2_7 -1.079  -0.018c 
  (0.114)  (0.096) 
DIV8+ 0.746  -0.011 
  (0.469)  (0.486) 
BROAD_CONST -0.089  -0.035c 
  (0.948)  (0.098) 
BROAD_IT 0.057  0.073a 
  (0.945)  (0.000) 
BROAD_OTHER -0.760  -0.018 
  (0.331)  (0.139) 
R-squared 0.149  0.290 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086  0.237 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.814  1.784 
F-statistic 2.357a  5.510a 
 (0.008)  (0.000) 
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
 
Table 6 explores the relation between family ownership and the extent of 
diversification in a group. We employ an interaction variable between family ownership with 
different levels of diversification. Under this specification, the coefficient on the interaction 
term picks up the difference, if any, in the effect of family ownership, family vote holdings 
between less diversified and highly diversified firms. Panel A of Table 6 shows that family 
ownership has different effect on less-diversified group and more-diversified group. P/B of 
an affiliate increases by 0.31% with 1% increase in family ownership in case of a more-
diversified group, while it increases by .08% when an affiliate is in a less-diversified group. 
The estimates are statistically significant. When the family ownership is represented by the 
control dimension, the results are  not statistically significant.  
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TABLE 6: This table reports OLS regressions examining differential impact of family ownership percentage, 
and family excess vote holdings on the value of an affiliate depending on the extent of diversification. 
Dependent variable is P/B in panel A which is an approximation to Tobin’s q. This is measured as [market value 
of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ [(book value of assets)] , where we calculate 
market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the year. Panel B uses ROA as 
dependent variable, measured as [(net income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total assets). The independent 
variables are a set of firm-specific attributes, family ownership, excess vote holdings, group dummies, and 
industry dummies. Family (Non-family) firms refer to those firms with (without) one or more family members 
are officers or directors, own 5% or more of the firm equity, either individually or as a group. Family ownership 
stake (FAM%) is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the family as a group or as an individual. Family 
excess vote holdings (VOTE) is the percentage of votes owned by the family in excess of the percentage of 
shares they own. Non-promoters block holders (BLOCK_NP) shareholdings is the percentage of shares held by 
non-promoter block holders is defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) as shareholders with 
no relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This group includes institutions, non-institutions, and 
individuals). Less diversified (Div2_7) is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if group is involved in two to 
seven industries, it is zero otherwise. Highly diversified (Div8+) is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if 
group is involved in eight or more industries, it is  zero otherwise. The sample contains Indian private firms 
(group or standalone) from manufacturing and service industry listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-500) 
during year 2005-2006. (Refer to Equation 5.) 
 
Included 
observations: 214 
 (Panel :A) 
Dependent Variable: P/B 
 (Panel: B) 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variable  Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. 
       
C  7.783 7.264  0.026 0.037 
   (0.003) (0.006)  (0.526) (0.370) 
FAM%  -0.012 0.005  0.000 0.000 
   (0.572) (0.804)  (0.755) (0.969) 
VOTE  -0.004 -0.012  0.000 0.000 
   (0.836) (0.617)  (0.705) (0.417) 
BLOCK_NP  -0.057a -0.055a  -0.001b -0.001b 
   (0.003) (0.005)  (0.037) (0.030) 
LOG(SALES)  0.170 0.209  0.006b 0.006b 
   (0.350) (0.260)  (0.031) (0.030) 
LOG(AGE)  -0.122 -0.174  0.014b 0.013b 
   (0.742) (0.645)  (0.015) (0.028) 
DIV2_7  -1.428b -0.677  -0.035a -0.039a 
   (0.041) (0.470)  (0.002) (0.008) 
DIV8+  0.515 1.361  -0.019 -0.030 
   (0.585) (0.462)  (0.212) (0.301) 
(DIV2_7)*(FAM%)  0.082b    0.001b   
   (0.026)    (0.045)   
(DIV8+)*(FAM%)  0.308b    0.000   
   (0.018)    (0.964)   
(DIV2_7)*(VOTE)    0.004    0.001 
     (0.894)    (0.153) 
(DIV8+)*(VOTE)    0.003    0.001 
     (0.953)    (0.414) 
BROAD_CONST  1.111 0.917  -0.034b -0.039a 
   (0.235) (0.345)  (0.023) (0.009) 
BROAD_IT  0.502 0.393  0.069a 0.065a 
   (0.507) (0.625)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BROAD_OTHER  -0.713 -0.577  -0.012 -0.013 
   (0.278) (0.388)  (0.241) (0.211) 
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R-squared  0.134 0.091  0.286 0.280 
Adjusted R-squared  0.083 0.036  0.244 0.237 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.962 1.936  1.871 1.888 
F-statistic  2.597a 1.671c  6.724a 6.518a 
  (0.003) (0.075)  (0.000) (0.000) 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
 
         Table 6, Panel B performs the same analysis as Panel A but uses ROA as the dependent 
variable. However, results are somewhat different in that  family ownership (%) has a slightly 
higher but statistically significant impact on affiliates of a less diversified group . The 
interaction term with the family vote-holding also shows that there is no differential impact of 
family control on the performance of affiliates belonging to   less- vs. more-diversified 
groups. 
         Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 are  extension of Table 6. Table 7-1 introduces the three 
dimensions of family ownership in each of the three equations, while 7-2 introduces all three 
definitions in the same equation. The independent variable is P/B and ROA respectively in 
Panel A and Panel B in both tables.  
TABLE 7-1. This table reports OLS regressions examining differential impact of family ownership percentage, 
and family excess vote holdings, and family management on the value of an affiliate depending on the extent of 
diversification. Dependent variable is P/B in panel A which is an approximation to Tobin’s q. This is measured 
as [market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ [(book value of assets)] , 
where we calculate market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the year. Panel B 
uses ROA as dependent variable, measured as [(net income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total assets).  The 
independent variables are a set of firm-specific attributes, family ownership, excess vote holdings, group 
dummies, and industry dummies. Family (Non-family) firms refer to those firms with (without) one or more 
family members are officers or directors, own 5% or more of the firm equity, either individually or as a group. 
Family ownership stake (FAM%) is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the family as a group or as an 
individual. Family excess vote holdings (VOTE) is the percentage of votes owned by the family in excess of the 
percentage of shares they own. Family Management (MGMT) is a dummy variable, it takes on a value of 1 if 
CEO is a family member, 0 otherwise. Non-promoters block holders (BLOCK_NP) shareholdings is the 
percentage of shares held by non-promoter block holders is defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of 
India) as shareholders with no relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This group includes 
institutions, non-institutions, and individuals). Less diversified (Div2_7) is a dummy variable which is equal to 
1 if group is involved in two to seven industries, it is zero otherwise. Highly diversified (Div8+) is a dummy 
variable which is equal to 1 if group is involved in eight or more industries, it is  zero otherwise. The sample 
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contains Indian private firms (group or standalone) from manufacturing and service industry listed in Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE-500) during year 2005-2006. (Refer to Equation 5.) 
 
Included 
observations: 175 
(Panel:A) 
Dependent Variable: P/B 
 (Panel:B) 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variable Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.   Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
             
C 7.593b  7.366b  8.082b   0.036  0.045  0.051 
  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.014)   (0.461)  (0.372)  (0.313) 
FAM% -0.012  0.014  0.010   0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.624)  (0.569)  (0.681)   (0.995)  (0.613)  (0.521) 
VOTE -0.016  -0.017  -0.025   0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.419)  (0.502)  (0.220)   (0.899)  (0.538)  (0.731) 
MGMT -0.821  -0.904  -1.227   -0.012  -0.013  -0.029b 
  (0.174)  (0.157)  (0.189)   (0.230)  (0.176)  (0.047) 
BLOCK_NP -0.067a  -0.066a  -0.066a   -0.001c  -0.001c  -0.001b 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.041) 
DIR 0.015  0.006  0.005   0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.345)  (0.718)  (0.720)   (0.459)  (0.489)  (0.343) 
LOG(SALES) 0.316  0.366c  0.339   0.007c  0.007c  0.007b 
  (0.141)  (0.100)  (0.128)   (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.043) 
LOG(AGE) -0.238  -0.284  -0.286   0.007  0.006  0.005 
  (0.577)  (0.514)  (0.511)   (0.299)  (0.391)  (0.454) 
DIV2_7 -2.090a  -0.972  -1.597   -0.029b  -0.029c  -0.036b 
  (0.008)  (0.364)  (0.121)   (0.020)  (0.079)  (0.023) 
DIV8+ -0.443  1.285  0.869   -0.019  -0.022  -0.024 
  (0.675)  (0.508)  (0.491)   (0.272)  (0.473)  (0.219) 
(DIV2_7)*(FAM%) 0.089b         0.001c       
  (0.022)         (0.084)       
(Div8+)*(FAM%) 0.357a         0.001       
  (0.009)         (0.762)       
(DIV2_7)*(VOTE)    -0.005         0.000    
     (0.887)         (0.357)    
(DIV8+)*(VOTE)    -0.018         0.000    
     (0.737)         (0.628)    
(DIV2_7)*(MGMT)       0.892         0.031 
        (0.487)         (0.119) 
(DIV8+)*(MGMT)       -0.773         0.025 
        (0.694)         (0.402) 
BROAD_CONST 0.042  -0.017  -0.162   -0.035c  -0.038c  -0.033 
  (0.974)  (0.990)  (0.906)   (0.098)  (0.079)  (0.120) 
BROAD_IT 0.220  0.149  -0.022   0.074a  0.071a  0.073a 
  (0.783)  (0.864)  (0.979)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BROAD_OTHER -0.996  -0.757  -0.736   -0.018  -0.018  -0.017 
  (0.195)  (0.335)  (0.349)   (0.146)  (0.138)  (0.168) 
R-squared 0.207  0.149  0.153   0.303  0.294  0.301 
Adjusted R-squared 0.137  0.075  0.079   0.242  0.232  0.240 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.040  2.001  2.007   1.960  1.987  2.006 
F-statistic 2.975a  2.005b  2.071b   4.973a  4.758a  4.925a 
  (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.016)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
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TABLE 7-2. This table reports OLS regressions examining the combined impact of family ownership 
percentage, and family excess vote holdings, and family management on the value of an affiliate depending on 
the extent of diversification. Dependent variable is P/B in panel A which is an approximation to Tobin’s q. This 
is measured as [market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt]/ [(book value of 
assets)] , where we calculate market value of equity using closing stock prices on the last trading day of the 
year. Panel B uses ROA as dependent variable, measured as [(net income + interest) * (1-tax rate))]/(total 
assets).  The independent variables are a set of firm-specific attributes, family ownership, excess vote holdings, 
group dummies, and industry dummies. Family (Non-family) firms refer to those firms with (without) one or 
more family members are officers or directors, own 5% or more of the firm equity, either individually or as a 
group. Family ownership stake (FAM%) is the percentage of all classes of shares held by the family as a group 
or as an individual. Family excess vote holdings (VOTE) is the percentage of votes owned by the family in 
excess of the percentage of shares they own. Family Management (MGMT) is a dummy variable, it takes on a 
value of 1 if CEO is a family member, 0 otherwise. Non-promoters block holders (BLOCK_NP) shareholdings 
is the percentage of shares held by non-promoter block holders is defined by SEBI (Securities and Exchange 
Board of India) as shareholders with no relation with the firm other than via equity holdings (This group 
includes institutions, non-institutions, and individuals). Less diversified (Div2_7) is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if group is involved in two to seven industries, it is zero otherwise. Highly diversified (Div8+) is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if group is involved in eight or more industries, it is  zero otherwise. The 
sample contains Indian private firms (group or standalone) from manufacturing and service industry listed in 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-500) during year 2005-2006. (Refer to Equation 5.) 
 
Included 
observations: 175 
 
(Panel:A) 
Dependent Variable: P/B  
(Panel:B) 
Dependent Variable: 
ROA 
Variable Coeff.  Coeff. 
C 8.873a  0.072 
  (0.007)  (0.156) 
FAM% -0.027  0.000 
  (0.310)  (0.445) 
VOTE -0.041  -0.001 
  (0.114)  (0.123) 
MGMT -1.086  -0.032b 
  (0.243)  (0.029) 
BLOCK_NP -0.067a  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.037) 
DIR 0.013  0.000 
  (0.415)  (0.568) 
LOG(SALES) 0.279  0.007c 
  (0.201)  (0.051) 
LOG(AGE) -0.186  0.008 
  (0.668)  (0.218) 
DIV2_7 -3.674b  -0.084a 
  (0.020)  (0.001) 
DIV8+ -2.513  -0.067 
  (0.330)  (0.101) 
(DIV2_7)*(FAM%) 0.114b  0.002b 
  (0.015)  (0.017) 
(Div8+)*(FAM%) 0.426a  0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.581) 
(DIV2_7)*(VOTE) 0.042  0.001b 
  (0.251)  (0.030) 
(DIV8+)*(VOTE) 0.068  0.001 
  (0.271)  (0.257) 
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(DIV2_7)*(MGMT) 0.447  0.026 
  (0.725)  (0.190) 
(DIV8+)*(MGMT) -0.604  0.032 
  (0.762)  (0.311) 
BROAD_CONST -0.342  -0.040c 
  (0.799)  (0.061) 
BROAD_IT -0.145  0.070a 
  (0.865)  (0.000) 
BROAD_OTHER -1.043  -0.017 
  (0.179)  (0.158) 
R-squared 0.220  0.333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.130  0.256 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.042  1.998 
F-statistic 2.447a  4.334a 
 (0.002)  (0.000) 
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
 
Panel A of Table 7  shows that family ownership (FAM%) has different effect on 
less-diversified vs. more- diversified groups. The coefficient is statistically significant  for the 
affiliate of a highly diversified group as well as less diversified group. With every 1% 
increase of family ownership firm value (P/B) increases by 0.36% for the affiliate of  a highly 
diversified group, while it increases by 0.09% when an affiliate is in a less diversified group. 
However, family excess vote holding (VOTE) and family management (MGMT) are found to 
be statistically insignificant. Panel B shows that none of the three dimensions of ownership 
has a significant differential impact on ROA between affiliates of a less- vs. more-diversified 
group  
Table 7-2 is similar to Table 7-1 except that in this case family ownership, family 
excess vote holding enter in the model simultaneously. However, overall results remain 
similar to  those in Table 7-1. 
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6. Summary & Conclusions 
The existing literature (Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 
(2000), Berger and Ofek (1995) among others) on corporate governance from US market 
indicates that firm value decreases with diversification and family ownership effects firm 
value positively(Villalonga and Amit (2006), Anderson and Reeb (2003) ). Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) have investigated these issues in the context of India. By using the data for 
year 1993, they report 1) that firm value decreases with the diversification of firm but after a 
certain threshold firm value increases with the diversification  and b) insider ownership 
positively affects performance of group affiliates as well as standalone firms.. During their 
study period, however, some important data required for their research were not simply 
available.  The absence of detailed data made Khanna and Palepu choose insider ownership 
as a proxy for family ownership. Since 2005-2006, more precise data have become available 
thanks to new and stricter disclosure rules. This provides us an opportunity to revisit their 
findings. We also reexamine the findings of Krishna and Palepu (2000) from the perspective 
of the broader definition of family ownership (ownership percentage, management, and 
control) recommended by Villalonga and Amit (2006).  
To investigate the effect of family ownership on the performance of a group affiliate 
as well as a standalone firm, we employ a sample of 214 Indian firms selected from the 2005-
2006 BSE 500 index. Using both market measure and accounting measure as measures of 
performance, we find that family ownership affects the performance of group affiliates more 
positively than that of standalone firms. Group affiliated firms initially underperform 
standalone firms but after certain level of family ownership they overperform standalone 
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firms. We also find that the percentage of shares held by family owners of a business group 
has differential impacts on the performance of an affiliate, depending on whether the affiliate 
belongs to a less-diversified or more-diversified group. The impact of family ownership is 
more positive for affiliates of more-diversified groups. However, other two definitions of 
family ownership----excess vote holdings and involvement of family in the firm’s 
management----are not found as important as the percentage of family ownership.  We also 
find that external blockholders affect a firm’s value negatively. Our results are in contrast 
with the existing literature of diversification and family ownership on developed market 
especially, US and UK. 
Our results provide further insight about the corporate governance in emerging 
markets which are often characterized by poor disclosure rules, low minority shareholder 
protection, highly concentrated shareholdings, thin takeover market, poor judicial system, and 
inadequate level of financial intermediaries.  These markets at the same time known for high 
number of family owned businesses--- passed from one generation to the next.. It seems that 
under such environment, family ownership is beneficial to the society and contributes to the 
value of the group affiliates, especially when the affiliate is part of a highly diversified group. 
Highly diversified firms are almost synonymous with families who have accumulated years 
of successful decision-making, and established name in the market, making it easier for these 
groups to float a new product or add another firm to the group. Also, because of their larger 
size, it is easier for highly diversified groups to replicate the functions of intermediary 
institutions which are often inadequate in emerging economics. Additionally, the families 
owning larger groups  often carry more clouts to  influence  local and national politics, thus 
providing additional benefits to their affiliates. 
At least two findings of this paper contribute to our knowledge and understanding of 
the impact of family ownership on the performance of Indian firm. First, family ownership 
38 
 
have a significant positive impact on the group affiliates (as opposed to stand alone). Krishna 
and Palepu (2000) did not find the differential effect perhaps because of the unavailability of 
the family ownership data. Their insider ownership data included both the family ownership 
as well ownership by corporate promoters.  Second, the superior performance of the more-
diversified group may be attributed to greater family ownership. Krishna and Palepu (2000) 
offered this as a possible explanation of their finding in this regard. This paper provides valid 
tests to establish this link. 
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Essay 2 
IT OUTSOURCING DECISIONS AND FIRM VALUE 
 
1. Introduction & Motivation 
 Outsourcing involves make-or-buy decision by firms. A firm that is buying its product or 
service is called the buyer or user and the firm supplying such product or service is called the 
seller or vendor.  Outsourcing in general has experienced a tremendous growth in recent years 
and thus received enormous media and political attention because of its potential impact on the 
economy. IT (Information Technology) outsourcing has observed perhaps the highest growth in 
the outsourcing arena. Broadly speaking IT outsourcing includes areas such as data center, data 
management, computing service, telecommunications, system design, data networking, etc. Loh 
and Venkatraman (1992, p. 9) conclude that IT outsourcing entails a “significant contribution by 
external vendors in the physical and/or human resources associated with the entire or specific 
components of the IT infrastructure in the user organization.”  
Projected figures of IT outsourcing growth by leading consultancy and government 
bodies are staggering. EBS, a technology research, and consulting firm, 
(http://www.ebstrategy.com/outsourcing/trends/statistics.htm) summarizes the job loss and 
market potential of IT outsourcing through various sources as follows:  
• According to the U.S Department of Commerce, $131.01 billion worth of legal 
work, computer programming, telecommunications, banking, engineering, 
management consulting, and other private services was exported by 2003.  
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• International Data Corporation (IDC) predicts that the global IT-enabled services 
market will account for revenues of $1.2 trillion by 2006.   
• Forrester Research projects that by year 2015 as many  as 3.3 million US jobs and 
$136 billion in wages could be moved to such countries as India, China, and 
Russia.  
• A leading financial service firm WR Hambrecht predicts that the offshore IT 
service market is expected to grow at compounded annual growth rate of 43% 
through 2008 to a size of 56 billion. 
 
The reasons for the extraordinary growth of outsourcing in the IT industry perhaps can be 
found  in the survey conducted by Hayes, Hunton, and Reck (2000), These author  survey the IT 
literature and identify four major reasons for outsourcing. The reasons are (1) cost reduction, (2) 
importance of core competencies, (3) flexibility, and (4) economies of scale and scope. 
Outsourcing can allow a firm to access better skilled or cheap labor to do the same task which 
helps in reducing cost5.  The ability to shift resources from non-core function to core function is 
another advantage of outsourcing. A firm that does not consider IT as its core function might 
decide to outsource to conserve its core resources.  Outsourcing affords an IT firm the flexibility 
to adapt to changes in technology just by changing the contract with the vendor. Outsourcing 
providers devote their full resources in delivering IT function to buying firms. Consequently, the 
providers gain better skills and competence in dealing with IT problems. The economy of scale 
achieved by providers can be shared by buying firms.   
                                                            
5 However, some studies have shed doubt on such motives as short term cost cutting can be harmful for firm value in 
long run (Quinn, Doorley and Paquette 1990). 
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  Of course, IT outsourcing, as in any outsourcing decisions, is associated with some risk 
as well.  Hancox & Hackney (2000), and Bahli & Rivard (2003) offer four types of risk facing an 
outsourcing buyer. They are (1) lock-in, (2) contractual amendments, (3) unexpected transition 
and management costs, and (4) disputes and litigation. Lock-in is a situation in which parties 
cannot break or change contract without incurring significant costs. Credible commitment (both 
parties invest partially in facility) or giving contracts to multiple vendors can mitigate such risk. 
The risk of contractual amendment occurs when participating firms have to renegotiate their 
contracts due to change in environments. This cost can be avoided if parties agree to have 
sequential relations or flexible contracts. Unexpected transition and management risks include 
hidden or underestimated cost at the time of planning. Such costs stem from participants’ lack of 
expertise with outsourcing.  Disputes and litigation risk emanates from vendor’s lack of expertise 
in outsourced activity and measurement problem. A vendor’s lack of expertise leads it to sign a 
contract with promises that cannot be kept. Because of changing environments and complexity of 
the underlying task, it is often difficult for buyers to measure the efforts made by a vendor in 
providing quality products or services.  To reduce unexpected dispute and litigation cost, the 
buyer can hire external technical or legal experts or develop alternative means of dispute 
handling.  
Even when the buyer reduces or avoids these risk by incurring a reasonable cost, the 
success is not guaranteed as many outsourcing contracts fail.  DiamondCluster International 
(now Diamond Management & Technology Consultants, Inc.), a premier global management 
consulting firm, reports that poor provider performance, change in strategic direction, non-
realization of cost savings and breach of contract are leading reasons for termination of onshore 
and offshore outsourcing contracts. 
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In order for IT outsourcing to be value enhancing, the buyer must preserve the benefits to 
be derived from such decisions while keeping the associated risk in check. The stock market, 
therefore, is likely too have varying reactions to the IT outsourcing, depending on its perception 
of how able the client is to derive benefits and/or whether the client is capable of handling the 
risk associated with the outsourcing decision. Also, it can be assumed that outsourcing clients 
have some distinguishable characteristics from those who do not outsource.  These are the two 
issues we examine in this paper. Two major objectives of this paper are 1) to study abnormal 
returns associated with announcements of IT outsourcing by client firms and to see if these 
returns are related to some specific firm characteristics, and 2) to explore the characteristics that 
differentiate firms that outsource IT services.  We examine IT outsourcing decisions of non-IT-
focused US clients in which the vendors reside in or outside the US.  Restricting the sample to 
US clients allow us to examine outsourcing decisions keeping constant the political, social, and 
economic environment facing these firms. Also, the market and accounting data for US clients 
are more easily available and more reliable.  
We make significant contribution to the literature. First, this is a first attempt to link firm 
characteristics and firm value via outsourcing: earlier studies have confined themselves to a 
limited number of firm characteristics. We employ an extended set of variables to assess their 
impact on announcement returns, based on a-priori expectations.  Second, previous studies use a 
small sample of 29 firms, making it difficult to generalize In this paper we employ 63 firms and 
perform logit analysis comparing outsourcing firms with a peer group that do not outsource. 
Third, this will be first study on post IT bubble bust period covering a time period 2001 to 2005. 
There is no available outsourcing study that has tested their study in this regime. Finally, it 
provides implications for how to develop successful outsourcing contracts. 
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This essay proceeds as follows. Section II provides the literature survey. Hypotheses are 
developed in Section III.  Sample, data, and methodology are discussed in Section IV. Section V 
presents results and Section VI concludes. 
2. Literature Survey 
 Available literature on IT outsourcing can be divided into five groups. The first group of 
research focus on the business impact of IT outsourcing.  These studies are concerned with the 
cost-saving goal of the users.(Grover, Cheon, and Teng (1996) and Loh and Venkatraman 
(1992)). The second group of research is primarily concerned about the decision making process 
of outsourcing (Loh and Venkatraman (1992) and Smith, Mitra, and Narasimhan  (1998)). The 
third group  comes from strategic management field where relationship is more focus of study ( 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993), Kern  and Willcocks (2002), Nam, Rajagopalan, Rao, and 
Chudhury (1996). The fourth group is concerned about risk analysis of out sourcing from various 
perspectives. (Aubert, Patry, and Rivard (1998), and Earl (1996)). The fifth group is the most 
recent and examines the outsourcing issue in light of financial theories to understand the 
implication of outsourcing from shareholders point of view. This group mainly uses the event 
study methodology to test the price impact of IT outsourcing announcements (Dos Santos, 
Peffers, and Mauer (1993), Hayes, Hunton, and Reck (2000), Im, Dow, and Grover (2001), Peak, 
Windsor, Conover (2002), and Oh & Gallivan (2004). 
 Loh and Venkatraman (1992) test a model of the determinants of IT outsourcing using 
both business as well as IT perspective. They find that business cost and IT cost are the main 
driving force for IT outsourcing decision. They also find that low economic returns on IT 
investment are also a motivation for managers to outsource their IT functions. Smith et al. (1998) 
study on pre-event firm characteristics reveals that firms who outsource have lower overhead 
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cost, lower cash reserve, and higher debt before the outsourcing event. Also,  their long-term 
debt and financial leverage increases before IT outsourcing.  
 Dos Santos et al. (1993) find that innovative IT investments increase more value than 
follow up projects. This behavior of stock market is independent of industry classification. They 
conclude that IT investments are zero NPV projects but innovative IT investment increase firm 
value. Hayes et al. (2000) find that market react positively to the announcement of IT 
outsourcing when an outsourcing firm is smaller in size and when it is in the service industry. 
They attribute such positive price reaction to the reduction of information asymmetry of these 
firms caused by IT outsourcing announcements. Im et al. (2001) too find that markets reaction 
(in terms of price and volume) are negatively related to firm size but the relation turns positive 
over time. Peak et al. (2002) study the effect of outsourcing on firms’ risk. They find that 
initially a large-company’s IS/IT outsourcing announcement has a value-neutral effect, but a 
positive impact in the long run. They also report that weaker firms experience increased risk, 
although healthier firms experience risk reduction. They considered firms with multiple 
unprofitable or low-rating years during 1988-1993 as weaker firms and firms with primarily 
profitable years during 1988-1993 as healthier firms. Oh  & Gallivan (2004) test the extent to 
which sources of IT outsourcing transaction risk influence investor’s reactions to IT outsourcing 
announcements. They find that the asset specificity of the IT resources or the size of the contract 
is negatively correlated to investors’ reaction. However, they find that contract duration and 
performance monitoring is not significantly associated with the market reaction.  
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3. Hypothesis Development  
 
3.1. Market Reaction to Outsourcing Announcements  
 
There are many reasons to believe that IT outsourcing announcements would be 
perceived as positive news by investors. As suggested by Hayes et al. (2000), firms outsource its 
functions because of many reasons, including   increased economies of scale and scope, 
concentration on core business, increased flexibility, and the resulting improved cost efficiencies. 
In essence, the cost efficiencies fall under two major categories: long-term measures and short 
term  measures. Quinn et al (1990) suggest that, to reap the full benefit of IT outsourcing, a firm 
must make this decision only with long-term benefits in mind. In other words, the IT outsourcing 
by itself might not elicit a positive market reaction unless investors believe that this decision is 
designed to provide long-term benefits to the contracting firm. As such, the market reaction to IT 
announcements will vary depending on the investors’ perception regarding the firm’s ability to 
translate this decision to increased long-term cash flows (through cost reduction) or decreased 
long-term risk exposure. It is expected that investors will analyze the IT outsourcing decision in 
light of the characteristics and the soundness of the decision-making process of the announcing 
firm. This leads to Hypothesis 1 as below. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Market reaction to announcements of IT outsourcing will depend on the 
market’s perception about the cost-saving (or risk handling) ability of firm. 
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3.2. Determinants of Outsourcing 
Outsourcing decision is  similar  to make or buy decision in which costs and benefits of 
this decision are to be carefully analyzed. Benefits are derived from potential cost and/or risk 
reduction of the contracting firm. Direct costs are related to hiring and retaining of the IT service 
provider. Indirect costs originate from various sources.  Earl (1996) describes these sources as  
loss of in-house IT capability, loss of power with respect to the vendor, hidden costs, 
technological obsolescence, loss of innovative ability, and the loss of key IT employee. Hancox 
& Hackney (2000), and Bhali & Rivard (2003) identify other sources: lock-in, contractual 
amendments, unexpected transitions and management costs, and disputes and litigation. 
Despite the costs, some firms choose to outsource their IT function while others in the 
same industry do not. Loh and Venkatraman (1992) test a model to determine why a firm might 
decide to outsource.  They find that business cost and IT costs are the main driving force for the 
IT outsourcing decision. They add that low economic returns on IT investment are also a 
motivation for managers to outsource their IT functions. Smith et al.’s (1998) study on pre-event 
firm characteristics reveal that outsourcing firms have lower overhead cost, lower cash reserve, 
and higher debt before the outsourcing event. Also, long-term debt of these firm increases 
immediately prior to the outsourcing announcements. These observations lead us to believe that 
those firms who outsource have different financial characteristics from those who do not. Hence, 
we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: Firms who outsource will have different characteristics from those who do 
not. 
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4. Methodology, Data and Variables 
4.1     Testing of Hypothesis 1 
4.1.1     Testing of Hypothesis 1: Methodology 
  The objective of hypothesis 1 is to test whether market reaction of investors depends on 
firm characteristics. Earlier studies have used market model for their event study e.g. Santos et al 
(1993) , Hayes et al (2001), Im et al (2001) and Oh and Gallivan (2004).  
We will use risk adjusted return. We use Fama-French Model for event study. 
itihmlismbftmtimktiftit HMLSMBrrrr εβββα +++−+=− ][][][ ,,,  
 
itihmlismbmtimktiit HMLSMBRR εβββα ++++= ][][][ ,,, …………………….…….(1) 
 
 
Where: 
 
mtR : rate of return market portfolio on day t, 
itR : rate of return of firm i on day t, 
iα : intercept for firm i, 
imkt ,β : slope parameter for market on firm i, 
ismb,β : slope parameter for Small Minus Big stock (SMB) firm i, 
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ihml ,β : slope parameter for High Minus Low stock (HML) firm i, 
 
itε : error term 
 
Next we calculate abnormal returns (AR) using the market model. To calculate abnormal 
return we first calculated iα , imkt ,β , ismb,β  and  ihml ,β  using Fama French model by using 
daily stock return data during the period from 255 days prior to event to 46 days prior to 
event.  Then abnormal return is: 
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HMLSMBRRA ihmlismbmtimktiitit βββα +++−=  from this we calculate average 
abnormal return (AARt) as follows: 
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Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated using AAR with 
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Where t1 is the beginning trading day and t2 is ending trading day for the period.  
 
We will collect CAR values as described in equation 2B and run a  regression 
against firm characteristics. Equation 3 describes the general model setup.   
 
 CARi = f (firm characteristics) +  ε ………….(3) 
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4.1.2.       Testing of Hypothesis 1: Variables  
 
Loh and Venkatraman (1992) use business cost structure, business performance, financial 
leverage, cost structure, and performance variables to explain the outsourcing decision. They 
find that degree of IT outsourcing is positively related to both business and cost structure. They 
also find that degree of outsourcing is negatively related to performance. Smith et al. (1998) 
study on pre-event firm characteristics reveal that outsourcing firms have lower overhead cost, 
lower cash reserve, and higher debt than their peers before the outsourcing event. Additionally, 
long-term debt and financial leverage increase before the outsourcing decision is announced.  
1. Industry Classification (IND_Dummy): Market will react differently to the 
outsourcing decision by firms in different industry. Because market has different 
expectation for different industry, for firms involved in technology oriented area, e.g. 
auto-manufacturing, aircraft manufacturing, IT outsourcing is expected. However, for 
firms involved in food, banking, or other service industry IT outsourcing is less 
expected, as a result market will react to such decision sharply.  
From information asymmetry point of view service industry has less 
information available for its cost competitiveness because standard financial-
reporting system is unable to capture all the factors which create value in service 
industry (Lang and Warfield, 1997). However, announcement of outsourcing releases 
forward-looking strategic information for firms in service industry which benefits 
these firms by reducing information asymmetry; outsourcing decision signals the 
market that service firm is striving for the best. Previous studies by Gordon, 
Calantone, and Benedetto, 1993, and Roach, 1998 have shown that firms in service 
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industry invest higher proportion of their assets in information technology as 
compared to non-service industry. 
We expect positive and bigger reaction from the market in service industry as 
compared to non-service industry. We will use SIC codes to distinguish between 
different industries.  
2. Improvement in performance and cost saving: Firms which are seen as inefficient 
will receive a positive reaction from the market for outsourcing decision. IT 
Outsourcing decision by firm is seen as cost cutting measure by investors. Outside 
vendors can provide the same level of service at a low cost due their specialization 
and economies of scale and scope (Hayes et al 2000). Striving firms are seen as firms 
on the edge and if they do not take any cost cutting or sales improvement measure, 
their existence will be in danger.  
We use two measure of cost efficiency: cost of goods sold & overhead 
expenses over sales similar to Kaplan, 1989, and Smith , 1990, which measures the 
firm’s cost of operations including indirect expenses and operating margin similar to 
Kaplan, 1989 and Mitra &Chaya, 1996, which take out the effect of unusual 
situations and differences in accounting practices. We expect market will react more 
positively to any outsourcing decision done by inefficient firms.  
An oft-cited reason for outsourcing is focus on core competencies (Lacity, 
Hirchheim and Williocks, 1994). This is even intense during recession when firms 
start focusing on core business operations (McCue, A., 2005). If information 
technology does not fall into core competence area of a firm then IT outsourcing is 
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seen as conservation of resources and focus on greater strategic potential area by 
firms.   
Firms which outsource non-core activities, invest less in assets that can be 
captured indirectly through Sales/Assets (Smith et al 1998). As an example, if two 
firms are in same industry generating same sales but one has more assets as compared 
to the other, then the firm with higher assets is more in need of cutting down their 
assets or focus on core competence. Thus, we expect that when lower asset turnover 
ratio firm announces IT outsourcing, market perceives it as focusing on core 
competence or long-term cost cutting measure and respond with a positive reaction. 
Performance and cost saving measures :  
a. (CGOS)= Cost of Goods Sold & Other expenses/ Sales 
b.  (OM)= Operating Margin= (Operating expenses/Sales) 
c. (SAA)= Sales/Asset 
3. Cash Needs : Firms often take IT outsource decision to generate cash (Lacity, 
Hirchheim, and Willcocks, 1994, and McFarlan and Nolan, 1995). Sometime IT 
outsourcing decision is followed by acquisition of tangible and intangible assets of 
client by vendors (Smith et al., 1998). In such circumstances vendor pays 
introductory cash payment, cash payment deals are particularly attractive for firms 
with high leverage or other liabilities. Whenever such firms take outsourcing 
decision, investors perceive as positive move and react positively. We expect market 
reaction will be positive for outsourcing decision by highly levered or cash needy 
firms.  
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a. (LTDE)= Long-Term Debt/Equity 
b. (CASHS)= Cash & Equivalent/Sales 
 
The expanded equation 3 takes the following form: 
 
CARi =  0β  +  + 1β  (Ind_Dummy)+ 2β   (CGOS) +  3β   (SAA) + 4β  (OM) + 5β   
(LTDE) + 6β   (CASHS)  +ε ……………………………………………..……..(4) 
 
  
4.2.     Testing of Hypothesis 2 
4.2.1     Testing of Hypothesis 2: Methodology 
   The purpose of hypothesis 2 is to distinguish the characteristics of firms which take IT 
outsourcing decision from the firms which do not take IT outsourcing decision. The conditional 
logistic regression can be used to analyze the 1-1 matching in which one case has only one 
matching control. To perform this analysis, first we found the firm which is closest to  the firm 
which has gone for IT outsourcing on the basis of Total Asset size, M/B ratio, and Industry.  
 Ordinary logistic regression may be inappropriate for matched sample because it may 
give  biased result (Maddala, 1991, and McFadden, 1973).In such studies sample size is 
insufficient to measure the pair effect. However, using conditioning argument, one can eliminate 
the pair effect and estimate the other effects in which one is interested. Conditional logistic 
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regression is appropriate form of logistic regression. It takes the grouping into account by basing 
the maximum likelihood estimation of the model parameters on a conditional likelihood.   
We find the firm characteristics using COMPUSTAT. We will use IT Outsourcing as our 
dependent variable and independent variables as various firm characteristics variables which are 
described in detail in the following paragraphs. 
The logistic regression equation conditional on asset size, M/B and industry is employed here 
is  
(Outsourcing=1, else=0) =  
 
 f (firm characteristics) +  ε ………………………………………….….(5) 
 
 
4.2.2.       Testing of Hypothesis 2: Variables  
 
Dependent Variable 
Outsourcing is captured by a dummy variable: it takes on a value of 1 when firm take out 
sourcing decision and 0 otherwise.   
Independent Variables 
1. Improvement in performance and cost saving: We expect inefficient firms will go 
for IT outsourcing more often as compared to efficient firms because IT outsourcing 
is a tool for cutting cost.  
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2. Cash Needs: We expect highly levered firm and cash needy firms will choose more 
IT outsourcing than other firms among their peer groups because IT outsourcing 
decisions are often followed by introductory cash payments from vendors 
 
The expanded equation 5 takes the following form 
 
(Outsourcing=1, else=0) = 0β  + 1β  (CGOS) + 2β  (SAA) + 3β  (OM) + 4β  
(LTDE) + 5β  (CASHS) +ε …………...................................................................(6) 
 
4.3.  Data 
In the first phase of our data collection we used Lexis-Nexis to access all the articles and 
press releases about IT outsourcing from the period 2001 to 2005. To search articles related to IT 
outsourcing various combination of search terms (outsource, failures, litigation, disputes) are 
used in different sections (e.g. Business Finance and IT Industry). From Lexis –Nexis we 
obtained 5000 news items related to outsourcing from 2001- 2005. Only 496 news items were 
found relevant to IT Outsourcing announcement. As stated earlier, our sample consists of US 
clients who hire on-shore as well as off-shore vendors.  We start with 136 observations. To 
conduct our event study as well as cross-sectional study to understand the market behavior 
around the event and factors responsible for abnormal return, we need market data as well as 
accounting data. Accounting data for the selected firms are obtained from the Standard and 
Poor’s COMPUSTAT database. For the event study, we use the CRSP data base.  
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To test our second hypothesis, (characteristics of firms which outsource and which do 
not), we need a peer group that does not outsource. Out of 136 observations in the original 
sample, we find accounting and market information for 63 firms, which make our final sample.  
 
Table 1A Distribution of sample of 63 IT outsourcing announcing US firms during the period 2001-2005. The IT 
outsourcing announcements are identified from Lexis-Nexis news network. 
 
   Cumulative Cumulative 
Value Count Percent Count Percent 
2001 8 12.70 8 12.70 
2002 17 26.98 25 39.68 
2003 13 20.63 38 60.32 
2004 16 25.40 54 85.71 
2005 9 14.29 63 100.00 
Total 63 100.00 63 100.00 
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Table 1B Summary statistics of sample of 63 IT outsourcing announcing US firms during the period 2001-2005. The IT outsourcing announcements are 
identified from Lexis-Nexis news network. Accounting data is obtained from COMPUSTAT.  
 
 
ASSETS TOTAL 
(in millions) 
SALES NET 
(in millions) 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
EPS 
 
M/B 
 
DY 
 
DPS 
 
Manufacturing (29)         
 Mean 29786.190 33808.150 5.626 11.118 1.990 4.064 1.800 0.588 
 Median 23215.000 17660.000 6.161 16.980 2.260 3.139 1.507 0.567 
 Maximum 192811.000 265190.000 22.889 61.942 7.110 15.998 7.048 1.528 
 Minimum 1022.000 1432.167 -11.369 -169.966 -8.100 0.770 0.000 0.000 
         
Finance (17)         
 Mean 372753.600 23034.740 1.660 13.713 2.678 1.803 2.800 0.786 
 Median 88701.410 13152.500 1.400 12.805 2.515 1.503 2.539 0.810 
 Maximum 1520140.000 59746.760 5.086 23.738 7.300 3.352 7.984 2.000 
 Minimum 2815.705 536.003 0.212 3.903 0.680 0.757 0.000 0.000 
         
Others (17)         
 Mean 21030.220 17215.230 3.071 12.798 1.659 2.114 1.520 0.397 
 Median 15156.000 8152.000 3.765 9.802 1.440 1.851 1.204 0.275 
 Maximum 105748.000 91134.000 7.809 43.358 5.380 3.998 4.600 1.109 
 Minimum 1009.477 651.439 -9.406 -14.925 -1.200 0.409 0.000 0.000 
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Table 1, Panel A indicates that our sample is very different from the ones used in 
previous studies. Sample starts from 2001 and ends at 2005. The majority of observations are 
in years 2002 to 2004, almost 73%. Hence, it gives new insight on the market behavior on IT 
outsourcing as compared to past studies. Table 1, Panel B tells us that we have a fairly good 
mix of manufacturing, service and other industries:. 29 firms are in manufacturing, 17 firms 
are in financial services, and 17 firms are in other industries. Finance firms are 10 times 
larger than manufacturing firms in terms of total assets but half in sales. Manufacturing firms 
are performing better than finance and other firms in terms of ROA, ROE, and M/B. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Results for Hypothesis 1: Abnormal Returns 
 
Table 2 provides the results of overall market reaction for the IT Outsourcing 
announcement. It provides average abnormal returns during 13-day event window (-6, 0, +6).  
The result shows that market react positive to the news of outsourcing on the event day (day 
0). 
 Table 2 indicates that market react positively to the news on the event date. The 
positive reaction of the market starts some time six days before the event and on the day of 
announcement market react sharply on the positive direction. On the day of event abnormal 
return is significantly positive at the 10% significant level. Based on this we can say that 
outsourcing information do convey significant level of new information. 
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Table 2: Average abnormal returns for a sample of 63 IT outsourcing announcing US firms during the period 
2001-2005. The IT outsourcing announcements are identified from Lexis-Nexis news network. Abnormal 
returns are calculated using the Fama-French model parameters estimated over a 255-day period ending 46 days 
before the announcement date. Value weighted Index is used in the Fama-French model to compute betas. 
  
Day 
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive: 
Negative 
Portfolio Time-
Series 
(CDA) t 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
     
-6 0.50% 36:30  1.436c  0.869  
-5 -0.44% 30:36  -1.268  -0.608  
-4 0.31% 34:32  0.892  0.377  
-3 0.51% 36:30  1.205  1.162  
-2 -0.11% 34:32  -0.315  0.377  
-1 0.36% 33:33  0.866  0.210  
0 0.14% 38:28c  1.410c  1.315c  
1 0.01% 33:33  0.034  0.130  
2 0.18% 36:30  0.516  0.869  
3 0.03% 30:36  0.081  -0.608  
4 -0.05% 31:35  -0.144  -0.362  
5 -0.05% 30:36  -0.147  -0.608  
6 -0.28% 30:36  -0.796  -0.608  
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
 
To see the variation of CAR around the event window we split the window into small 
periods; (-5,-2), (-1,0), (-1,+1), (0,+1), (+2, +5), and (-5,+5). Table 3 provides the CARs for 
the three different windows. CARs indicate how the level of portfolio wealth is changing as 
we approach to event date. 
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Table 3: Cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 63 IT outsourcing announcing US firms during the period 
2001-2005. The IT outsourcing announcements are identified from Lexis-Nexis news network. Abnormal 
returns are calculated using the Fama-French model parameters estimated over a 255-day period ending 46 days 
before the announcement date. Value weighted Index is used in the Fama-French model to compute betas. The 
cumulative abnormal returns are calculated in the intervals.   
  
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive: 
Negative 
 
Portfolio 
Time-Series 
(CDA) t 
 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
 
(-5,-2) 0.27% 36:30  0.407  0.869  
(-1,0) 0.50% 30:36  1.016  -0.608  
(-1,+1) 0.51% 33:33  0.849  0.130  
(0,+1) 0.15% 34:32  0.314  0.377  
(+2,+5) 0.11% 32:34  0.153  -0.116  
(-5,+5) 0.89% 40:26b  0.782  1.854b  
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
 
 
Table 3 shows that none of the smaller windows (-1, 0), (-1, +1) and (0, +1) is 
insignificant, although some of the larger windows are significantly positive.  These findings 
signify that the information is leaked out in the market days before the day of actual 
announcement of outsourcing. An absence of  a significant abnormal for smaller windows is 
also evidenced in other studies, including Peak et al (2002), Hayes et al (2000), and Oh and 
Gallivan (2004). Since an outsourcing decision takes place after months of negotiations 
between the client and the vendor, the leakage of information is understandable.  
 
5.2.  Factors Explaining Abnormal Returns 
 
Table 3 shows that the (-5, 5) window is significantly positive at the 10% level, 
implying that on average IT outsourcing announcement has a positive effect on the client’s 
market return. To measure the effect of firm characteristics on market we perform a  cross-
sectional study using CAR of the (-5, 5) window and firm characteristics as independent 
variables. 
60 
 
 Table 4 reports the result of cross sectional study. R-square and adjusted R-
square are 0.545 and 0.297, respectively. Based on the F-test, the model is globally 
significant at 10%.  
Table 4: OLS regression to explain the valuation effect of 63 IT outsourcing announcement by US firms during 
the period 2001-2005. The IT outsourcing announcements are identified from Lexis-Nexis news network. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return during the eleven day announcement window CAR (-5, 5). 
The independent variables are: Manufacturing Dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to 
manufacturing industry otherwise equal to 0. CGOS is the cost of goods sold and other expense over sales, SAA 
is sales over assets, OM is operating expenses over sales, CASHS is cash and equivalent over sales, and LTDE 
is Long-Term Debt over equity.  
 
  
Expected 
Sign Coefficients t Sig. 
  
C  -2.991 -2.144 0.036b  
Manufacturing- 
Dummy - -0.313 -2.808 0.007a  
CGOS + 1.038 2.151 0.036b  
SAA - -0.533 -2.296 0.025b  
OM + 1.152 2.818 0.007a  
CASHS - -0.264 -1.468 0.148  
LTDE + 0.241 1.664 0.102  
          
 
Dependent Variable: CAR (-5, 5), F=2.116   , p=0.066 
R square = 0.545, Adjusted R Square = 0.297 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10%  
 
Table 4 provides evidence of industry effect. The coefficient of manufacturing 
dummy is -0.313 and statistically significant. It indicates that the market reacts more 
positively when non-manufacturing firm opt for outsourcing as compared to manufacturing 
firm. The result is similar to Hayes et al (2000). We have hypothesized that firms use IT 
outsourcing as a cost cutting tool and as such market reaction is likely to be positive. The 
coefficient of CGOS (Cost of Goods Sold and other expenses/ Sales) is positive and 
statistically significant: this implies that when firms incurring higher costs opt for IT 
outsourcing, the market reaction is positive.   
SAA (Sales/ Assets) indicates the firm efficiency. The coefficient (-0.533) of this 
variable is significantly negative. In other words, the more inefficient the firm is, the higher 
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the positive market reaction to the IT outsourcing announcement.  For less efficient firms, an 
IT outsourcing decision amounts to taking a positive step towards improved sales , speedier 
order processing, and better customer services, etc. As such, the market perceives the 
outsourcing decision as a positive step. In addition, the market might consider this decision as 
the firm’s moving back to its core business. The coefficient of OM (Operating expense/Sales) 
is positive and statistically significant. This result is consistent with our expectation, implying 
that the higher the pre-outsourcing operating cost relative to sales of a firm the more positive 
is the market reaction. 
Table 4 also provides support, albeit a weak one, for the hypothesis that higher the 
debt ratio (LTDE =Long-term debt/ Equity) of a firm, the more positive is the market reaction 
to the firm’s outsourcing announcement. There are two potential reasons for this result. First, 
potential revenue from the sale of the client’s IT assets might be used to lower the client’s 
debt. Second,   the reduction of IT assets, which are usually non-redeployable and therefore 
not suitable for debt financing, may be perceived as a risk-reducing measure by the market.  
 
5.3. Results for Hypothesis 2 
 
Using conditional logistic regression we attempt to find if there are discernible 
differences in firm characteristics between the outsourcing and non-outsourcing groups. The 
dependent variable in this regression is an indicator variable that is 1 for firms that take IT 
Outsourcing decision and 0 for the control firms (non-outsourcing firms). 
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Table 5: Conditional logistic regression to explain the firm characteristics which increases (or decreases) the 
odds of taking IT outsourcing decision. The conditional logistic regression is based on 1:1 matching (by asset 
size, M/B and industry) in which one case has only one matching control. Firms who outsource are our case and 
matching firms which do not outsource are control. Sample consist of 63 IT outsourcing announcement by US 
firms and 63 matching non-outsourcing firms during the period 2001-2005. The IT outsourcing announcements 
are identified from Lexis-Nexis news network. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equal to 1 
when firm choose to outsource and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are: CGOS is the cost of goods sold 
and other expense over sales, SAA is sales over assets, OM is operating expenses over sales, CASHS is cash 
and equivalent over sales, and LTDE is Long-Term Debt over equity. Probability related to each coefficient is 
reported in parenthesis.  
 
  
Expected 
Sign B  Exp(B) 
CGOS + 3.653b  38.590 
  (0.023)   
SAA - -0.291  0.748 
  (0.663)   
OM + 0.251  1.285 
  (0.447)   
CASHS - -0.480c  0.619 
  (0.076)   
LTDE + 0.071  1.074 
  (0.544)   
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10% 
 
Table 5 shows that CGOS (Cost of Goods and other expenses/Sales) and CASHS 
(Cash and Equivalent / Sales) are statistically significant- firms with higher values of CGOS 
and lower values of CASHS are more likely to take IT outsourcing decision. The Exp(B) 
shows the change in the odds6 of IT outsourcing decision for a one unit change in predictor; 
one unit increase in CGOS and one unit decrease in CASHS increases the odds of 
outsourcing by a factor of 38.59 and 0.62 respectively controlling for variables used for 
matching (assets size, M/B, and Industry). Firms with higher cost of goods & other expenses 
over sales use IT outsourcing as a tool to improve cost efficiency. This is in accordance with 
the efficiency of scale and scope argument of IT outsourcing. Firms with lower cash to sales 
have a higher probability of opting for IT outsourcing perhaps because these firms are more 
                                                            
6 The odds in favor of an event occurring is defined as the probability the event will occur 
divided by the probability the event will not occur. The odds ratio for a given independent 
variable represents the factor by which the odds (event) change for a one-unit change in the 
independent variable after controlling for other variables in the model. 
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likely to be in distress. In this environment, low cash firms find outsourcing to be an effective 
tool in meeting their short-term cash needs. This result is consistent with Lacity, Hirchheim, 
and Willcocks (1994) and McFarlan and Norlan (1995) argument that firms often take IT 
outsource decision to generate cash. 
 
6. Summary & Conclusion 
IT outsourcing occurs when a non-IT focused firm hires an IT vendor to provide IT 
services on behalf of the former. The major expected outcome of the decision to outsource is 
improved efficiency of the client through cost savings and concentrating on its core business 
functions. How does the market react when a client announces its IT outsourcing decision? 
What characteristics are more likely to induce a firm to make an outsourcing decision? These 
are the two questions that are embraced in this essay. 
Hayes et al. (2000), Peak et al. (2002), and Im et al. (2001), among other have 
examined these issues. Although results of these studies vary with respect to the market 
reaction to outsourcing announcements as well as to the type of firms that are likely to 
outsource, there are some agreements as well. For example, the market reacts positively to 
the announcement of IT outsourcing when this contract is given by smaller firms and by 
firms in the service industry. However, earlier studies have confined themselves to limited 
number of firm characteristics. In addition, the sample size has been rather small (e.g., Smith 
et al.’s (1998) sample size is 29) limiting their econometric tools to non-parametric tests. In 
this paper we employ 63 firms and apply parametric tests. Another advantage of this paper is 
its timeliness. Mc Cue (2001) and EquaTerra (2007) suggest that trend and motivation of 
outsourcing will change in recession (post IT bubble bust) because the economic downturn 
will force firms to focus on core business operations. During up-markets firms use IT 
outsourcing to improve performance but during down-markets firms use IT outsourcing to 
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reduce costs and remain competitive. Ours will be first study to link firm characteristics and 
firm value via outsourcing in the post IT bubble period (2001-2005). 
 We find IT outsourcing have a strong positive effect on stock prices  of 
announcing firms, especially for longer event windows. We also find that the higher the pre-
announcement inefficiency of a firm (as evidenced by lower asset turnover ratios, higher 
operating cost to sales,  higher cost of good sales to sales, and lower price-to-book), the 
greater the positive price reaction to the outsourcing announcements. We also find that for 
firms with higher information asymmetry problems (firms in the service industry) will elicit a 
higher positive market reaction at the time of outsource announcement. Also, a firm with a 
higher debt ratio is likely to receive a higher positive reaction to the announcement. Finally, 
firms that are likely to outsource are cost inefficient, and/or are cash needy. 
 An important implication to be derived from this study is that firms facing 
high operating costs and/or low asset turnover may be better of outsourcing the IT function. 
The market perceives this as a cost-saving measure. Whether and how the cost saving (or 
reduced risk) is realized is a topic for future research.
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Government (10.67%)  Private Industry (88%)  Joint Sector (0.60%) 
Foreign (13.44%)Indian (75%)
Foreign 
Business 
Group 
(4.5%) 
Foreign 
Stand 
Alone 
(8.89%) 
Indian 
Business 
Group 
(54%) 
Family owned= 
84.76%* 
Non‐ Family 
owned = 
15.23%* 
Indian 
Business 
Group 
(54%) 
Family owned= 
87.30%* 
Non‐ Family 
owned = 
12.70%* 
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